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THE CANADIAN AND U.S. RESPONSES TO 
SUBSIDIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE: 
TOWARD A HARMONIZED COUNTERVAILING 
DUTY LEGAL REGIME 
KEVIN C. KENNEDY· 
In Article 19 of the Canada-. U.S .. Free Trade Agreement, Canada and 
the United States agreed to establish a Working Group to devise a substi-
tute countervailing duty legal regime covering all bilateral trade. Con-
cluding with recommendations for such a harmonized regime, this Arti-
cle provides a detailed comparison of the remarkably parallel U.S. and 
Canadian countervailing duty statutes and administrative procedures 
against the background of the GA TT Code. 
INTRODUCTION 
Although the United States and Canada are each other's largest trading 
partners, with bilateral merchandise trade totaling $125 billion in 1985/ 
their trade relationship has not always been relaxed. The most important 
cause of friction has been each country's administration of its counter-
vailing duty (CVD) laws. For Canada, this has been an especially sensi-
tive issue, as reflected in Canada's reaction to the notorious Softwood 
Lumber decision by the U.S. Department of Commerce in 1986.2 In that 
determination the Commerce Department overruled its 1983 decision os-
tensibly because of changed factual circumstances (the number of users of 
stumpageS were fewer in 1986 than in 1983, thereby failing the Com-
merce Department's so-called "general availability" test), after having 
found in 1983 that Canadian stumpage fees· charged to the domestic lum-
ber industry were not an unlawful subsidy. This determination 
culminated in the imposition of a fifteen percent countervailing duty on 
• Associate Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law. J.D., Wayne State University School of 
Law; LL.M., Harvard Law School. 
L P. WONNACOlT, THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: THE QUEST FOR FREE TRADE 2 
(Institute for Int'l Econ., Policy Analyses in Int'l Econ. No. 16, 1987) [hereinafter WONNACOlT). 
Comparable figures for trade between the United States and Japan totalled S88 billion, and S108 
billion between the United States and the European Economic Community. Id. 
2. Certain Softwood Products from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,453 (Dep't Comm. 1986) (prelim. 
affirm. determination). For an economic critique of the Softwood Lumber case, see WONNACOTT, 
supra note 1, at 89-102. 
3. In general, "stumpage" refers to standing timber. Softwood Lumber at 37,455. 
4. A "stumpage fee" is the amount charged for removal of timber from government-owned land. 
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about $3 billion worth of Canadian lumber exports to the United States.1> 
In order to avoid filling the coffers of the U.S. Treasury by some $450 
million annually, an agreement was concluded between the two govern-
ments under the terms of which Canada agreed to impose a fifteen percent 
tax on certain softwood lumber exports destined for the United States.6 
During this time Canadian producers were not sitting idly by watching 
these events unfold. Whether by coincidence or design, the Canadian 
CVD law was invoked for the first time in 1986 against imports to Ca-
nada from the United States and a sixty-seven percent countervailing duty 
imposed on U.S. grain corn exports to Canada.7 All this was occurring 
against the backdrop of free trade negotiations between the United States 
and Canada being initiated. That a free trade agreement actually was 
reached at all is a credit to the perseverance and tenacity of the negotiators 
on both sides of the bargaining table. 
In response to this trade imbroglio, and in an attempt to defuse it, Ca-
nada and the United states agreed to submit all challenges to final admin-
istrative determinations of dumping or illegal subsidization to a binational 
panel composed of representatives from both countries for its resolution, 
thus substituting panel review for all judicial review under chapter 19 of 
the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA or Agreement).8 Bina-
tional panel review under chapter 19 of the FT A is provisional only, how-
ever. Canada and the United States further agreed to establish a Working 
Group whose task it will be to devise a substitute antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty legal regime within the first seven years of the Agreement.9 
Predicting the directions the Working Group might take requires an 
understanding of the current U.S. and Canadian CVD legal regimes. It 
appears that Canada and the United States have widely disparate views as 
to the proper role and scope of CVD legislation, particularly with respect 
to regional development programs. This paper first reviews and compares 
the two countries' CVD statutes, then compare administrative practices 
under those statutes. This paper concludes with proposals for a substitute 
5. WONNAcorr, supra note I, at 91, 97. 
6. See Holmer & Bello, The u.S.-Canada Lumber Agreement: Past As Prologue, 21 INT'L 
LAW. 1185, 1196-97 (1987). 
7. See Terry, Sovereignty, Subsidies, and Countervailing Duties in the Context of the Canada-
United States Trading Relationship, 46 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 48, 79 (1988). 
8. Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, I 987-Jan. 2, 1988, Canada-United States, 
27 I.L.M. 281 [hereinafter FTA]. 
9. Id. art. 1907. The FTA provides that a substitute antidumping and CVD legal regime is to 
be agreed to within the first five years of the FTA, with a two-year extension if the parties fail to 
reach agreement within the initial five-year period. If the parties fail to reach agreement by the end of 
the two-year extention, either party may terminate the FTA on six months notice. Id. art. 1906. 
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CVD legal regime. 
THE CURRENT CVD LEGAL REGIME OF CANADA 
AND THE UNITED STATES 
Both the United States and Canada substantially revised their an-
tidumping and countervailing duty legislation to bring it into line with 
two of the codes that were concluded in the 1979 Tokyo Round of multi-
lateral trade negotiations conducted under the aegis of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).IO The first of these codes was the 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT, popularly 
known as the Antidumping Code. ll The second was the Agreement on 
Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs arid Trade,12 commonly referred to as the 
Subsidies Code. These two codes were introduced into the domestic law of 
the United States and Canada by the U.S. Trade Agreements Act of 
197913 and by the Canadian Special Import Measures Act (SIMA).14 
The Canadian Countervailing Duty Law 
Two agencies are charged with the responsibility for administering 
CVD law in Canada. The Deputy Minister of National Revenue for 
Customs and Excise determines whether imported goods have received a 
subsidy as defined by SIMA 111 The Canadian Import Tribunal in turn 
determines whether the subsidization is causing or is likely to cause mate-
rial injury to the production of like goods in Canada. 16 
The Deputy Minister must commence a subsidy investigation on his 
10. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 
5,6, TI.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT). 
11. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 V.S.T. 4919, TI.A.S. No. 
9650 [hereinafter Antidumping Code). 
12. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12,1979,31 U.S.T 513, TI.A.S. No. 9619 
[hereinafter Subsidies Code). 
13. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified at scattered sec-
tions of titles 5, 13, 19 and 26 U.S. C.). 
14. Special Import Measures Act, ch. 25, 1984 Can. Stat. 739, as amended by Customs Act, ch. 
1, 1986 Can. Stat. 1 [hereinafter SIMA). See Giese, The Special Import Measures Act: Balancing the 
Interests of Foreign Exporters and Canadian Industries, 21 J. WORLD TRADE L. 9 (1987). 
15. SIMA, supra note 14, §§ 38-41. 
16. Id. §§ 31-48. On December 31,1988, the Canadian International Trade Tribunal replaced 
the Canadian Import Tribunal, assuming most of the latter's functions, most importantly the making 
of inquiry findings in antidumping and CVD cases. See Canadian International Trade Tribunal 
Becomes Canada's Principal Trade Remedy Agency, Int'l Econ. Rev. 9 Uuly 1989) (published by the 
USITC Office of Economics). 
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own initiative or upon receipt of a properly documented complaint1' "if 
he is of the opinion (a) that there is evidence that the goods have been or 
are being ... subsidized; and (b) that the evidence discloses a reasonable 
indication that the ... subsidization ... has caused, is causing or is likely 
to cause material injury or has caused or is causing retardation."18 Be-
cause SIMA places no restrictions on the standing of persons who may 
file a complaint with the Deputy Minister, the law is potentially more 
protectionist than permitted by the GATT Subsidies Code. The Code 
provides that under domestic law procedures for initiating a CVV investi-
gation, an investigation "shall normally be initiated upon a written re-
quest by or on behalf of the industry affected."19 This strongly suggests 
that only interested industry or worker groups have standing to file a 
CVD complaint. 
The Deputy Minister may decline to initiate an investigation for the 
reason that the evidence does- not disclose a reasonable indication of mate-
rial injury or retardation, in which case either he or the complainant may 
refer the question to the Import Tribunal for its determination.20 The 
Deputy Minister may also refer the question of reasonable indication of 
material injury or retardation to the Import Tribunal in the first in-
stance.21 The Deputy Minister must terminate an investigation once it has 
been initiated under two circumstances: (1) if prior to reaching a prelimi-
17. The Deputy Minister has 21 days within which to inform a complainant whether the com-
plaint is properly documented. SIMA, supra note 14, § 32(1). "Properly documented" means that: 
(a) the complaint 
(i) alleges that the goods have been or are being dumped or subsidized, specifies such 
goods and alleges that such dumping or subsidizing has caused, is causing or is likely to 
cause material injury or has caused or is causing retardation. 
(ii) states in reasonable detail the facts on which the allegations referred to in subpara-
graph (i) are based, and 
(iii) makes such other representations as the complainant deems relevant to the com-
plaint, and 
(b) the complainant provides 
(i) such information as is available to him to prove the facts referred to in subparagraph 
(a)(ii), and 
(ii) such other information as the Deputy Minister may reasonably require him to 
provide. 
[d. § 2(1). Within 30 days after notifying the complainant in writing that its complaint is properly 
documented, the Deputy Minister must commence an investigation. [d. § 31 (1). 
18. [d., § 31 (1 )(a), (b). "Retardation," in respect of the subsidizing of any goods means "mate-
rial retardation of the establishment of the production in Canada of like goods." [d. § 2(1). 
19. Subsidies Code, supra note 12, art. 2(1). 
20. SIMA, supra note 14, § 33(2). 
21. /d. § 34(b). 
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nary determination he concludes that there is insufficient evidence of sub-
sidizing, or the amount of the subsidy or the volume of the subsidized 
goods is negligible, or (2) if the Import Tribunal concludes that there is 
no reasonable indication of material injury or retardation. 22 
If an investigation is initiated and not sooner terminated, the Deputy 
Minister has ninety days from the date of initiation of the investigation to 
reach a preliminary determination of subsidization.2a The preliminary de-
termination must contain an estimate of the amount of the subsidy, a spec-
ification of the goods to which the preliminary determination applies, and 
the name of the importer.24 Notice of the preliminary determination is 
published in the Canada Gazette26 and a copy forwarded to the Canadian 
Import Tribunal for its injury determination.28 The Deputy Minister 
must make a final determination of subsidization within ninety days after 
making the preliminary determination.27 
While the Deputy Minister is making his final determination, the Im-
port Tribunal simultaneously commences the injury phase of the investi-
gation and must issue its injury order no later than 120 days after the date 
of receipt of the Deputy Minister's notice of a preliminary determina-
tion.28 If the Import Tribunal's inquiry results in an affirmative finding 
of injury, a countervailing duty in an amount equal to the amount of the 
subsidy on the imported goods is collected.29 Pending the Import Tribu-
nal's finding, importers of the subsidized goods must either pay a provi-
sional countervailing duty or post other security in an amount equal to the 
estimated amount of the subsidy upon demand of the Deputy Minister.ao 
SIMA's Definition of "Subsidy" 
The Special Import Measures Act provides sweeping definitions for 
both "subsidy" and "subsidized goods." Section 2(1) of SIMA provides 
that a "subsidy" includes: 
22. [d. § 36. 
23. [d. § 38(1). This 90-day period may be extended to a period of 135 days in cases involving 
novel or complex issues, a large variety of goods or number of persons, difficult evidentiary problems, 
or "any other circumstance ... that, in the opinion of the Deputy Minister, makes it unusually 
difficult" to reach a termination decision. [d. § 39(1). 
24. [d. § 38(1 )(b), (c). 
25. [d. § 39(2). 
26. /d. § 42(1). 
27. [d. § 41(1). 
28. [d. § 43(1). 
29. [d. § 3. 
30. [d. § 8(1). 
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[AJny financial or other commercial benefit that has accrued or 
will accrue, directly or indirectly, to persons engaged in the pro-
duction, manufacture, growth, processing, purchase, distribution, 
transportation, sale, export or import of goods, as a result of any 
scheme, program, practice or thing done, provided or implemented 
by the government of a country other than Canada, but does not 
include the amount of any duty or internal tax imposed on goods 
by the government of the country of origin or country of export 
from which the goods, because of their exportation from the coun-
try of export or country of origin, have been exempted or have 
been or will be relieved by means of refund or drawback.31 
Because SIMA defines a subsidy as "including" the foregoing programs, 
this definition is illustrative, not exhaustive. Given its breadth, it has the 
potential for being a protectionist weapon in the hands of an overly-ag-
gressive or retaliatory-minded Department of National Revenue. 
In addition to the definition of "subsidy," section 2(1) of SIMA pro-
vides the following definitions of "subsidized goods": 
(a) goods in respect of the production, manufacture, growth, 
processing, purchase, distribution, transportation, sale, export, or 
import of which a subsidy has been or will be paid, granted, au-
thorized or otherwise provided, directly or indirectly, by the gov-
ernment of a country other than Canada, and includes (b) goods 
that are disposed of at a loss by the government of a country other 
than Canada, and any goods in which, or in the production, man-
ufacture, growth, processing or the like of which, goods described 
in paragraph (a) or (b) are incorporated, consumed, used or oth-
erwise employed.32 
While paragraph (a) is in large measure a reiteration of the "subsidy" 
definition, paragraph (b) specifically addresses state trading and "up-
stream" subsidies, i.e., imports that do not directly receive subsidies but 
incorporate components or inputs that were subsidized. 
In making subsidy determinations, SIMA instructs the Deputy Minis-
ter "in considering any question relating to the interpretation or applica-
tion of the definition 'subsidized goods' or 'subsidy' or the expression 'ex-
port subsidy,' [to] take fully into account the provisions of Articles 9 and 
11 of the Subsidies and Countervailing Duties Agreement [the GATT 
31. [d. § 2(1). 
32. [d. 
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Subsidies Code]."33 In Article 9 of the Subsidies Code, entitled "Export 
subsidies on products other than certain primary products," signatories 
are prohibited from granting export subsidies on products other than cer-
tain primary products.34 The Annex to the Subsidies Code lists twelve 
prohibited export subsidies by way of illustration. 311 In contrast to the pro-
33. [d. § 2(5). 
34. Subsidies Code, supra note 12, art. 9:1, 31 V.S.T. at 531. 
35. The annex to the Subsidies Code provides: 
Illustrative List of Export Subsidies 
(a) The provision by governments of direct subsidies to a firm or an industry contingent 
upon export performance. 
(b) Currency retention schemes or any similar practices which involve a bonus on 
exports. 
(c) Internal transport and freight charges on export shipments, provided or mandated by 
governments, on terms more favourable than for domestic shipments. 
(d) The delivery by governments or their agencies of imported or domestic products or 
services for use in the production of exported goods, on terms or conditions more favourable 
than for delivery of like or directly competitive products or services for use in the produc-
tion of goods for domestic consumption, if (in the case of products) such terms or conditions 
are more favourable than those commercially available on world markets to their exporters. 
(e) The full or partial exemption, remission, or deferral specifically related to exports, of 
direct taxes or social welfare charges paid or payable by industrial or commercial 
enterprises. 
(f) The allowance of special deductions directly related to exports or export performance, 
over and above those granted in respect to production for domestic consumption, in the 
calculation of the base on which direct taxes are charged. 
(g) The exemption or remission in respect of the production and distribution of exported 
products, of indirect taxes in excess of those levied in respect of the production and distri-
bution of like products when sold for domestic consumption. 
(h) The exemption, remission or deferral of prior stage cumulative indirect taxes on 
goods or services used in the production of exported products in excess of the exemption, 
remission or deferral of like prior stage cumulative indirect taxes on goods or services used 
in the production of like products when sold for domestic consumption; provided, however, 
that prior stage cumulative indirect taxes may be exempted, remitted or deferred on ex-
ported products even when not exempted, remitted or deferred on like products when sold 
for domestic consumption, if the prior stage cumulative indirect taxes are levied on goods 
that are physically incorporated (making normal allowance for waste) in the exported 
product. 
(i) The remission or drawback of import charges in excess of those levied on imported 
goods that are physically incorporated (making normal allowance for waste) in the ex-
ported product; provided, however, that in particular cases a firm may use a quantity of 
home market goods equal to, and having the same quality and characteristics as, the im-
ported goods as a substitute for them in order to benefit from this provision if the import 
and the corresponding export operations both occur within a reasonable time period, nor-
mally not to exceed two years. 
(j) The provision by governments (or special institutions controlled by governments) of 
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hibitory language of Article 9, Article 11 of the Subsidies Code, dealing 
with domestic subsidies, is merely hortatory. On the one hand, Article 11 
concedes that domestic subsidies "are widely used as important instru-
ments for the promotion of social and economic policy objectives" and, 
further, that the signatories to the Subsidies Code "do not intend to re-
strict the right of signatories to use such subsidies to achieve these and 
other important policy objectives which they consider desirable,"86 
including: 
.. 
[G Jovernment financing of commercial enterprises, including 
grants, loans or guarantees; government provision or government 
financed provision of utility, supply distribution and other opera-
tional or support services or facilities; government financing of re-
search and development programmes; fiscal incentives; and gov-
ernment subscription to, or provision of, equity capital. 
Signatories note that the above forms of subsidies are normally 
granted either regionally or by sector. The enumeration of forms 
of subsidies set out above is illustrative and non-exhaustive, and 
reflects these currently granted by a number of signatories to this 
Agreement. 
Signatories recognize, nevertheless, that the enumeration of 
forms of subsidies set out above should be reviewed periodically 
export credit guarantee or insurance programmes, of insurance or guarantee programmes 
against increases in the costs of exported products or of exchange risk programmes, at 
premium rates, which are manifestly inadequate to cover the long-term operating costs and 
losses of the programmes. 
(k) The grant by governments (o~ special institutions controlled by and/or acting under 
the authority of governments) of export credits at rates below those which they actually 
have to pay for the funds so employed (or would have to pay if they borrowed on interna-
tional capital markets in order to obtain funds of the same maturity and denominated in 
the same currency as the export credit), or the payment by them of all or part of the costs 
incurred by exporters or financial institutions in obtaining credits, in so far as they are 
used to secure a material advantage in the field of export credit terms. 
Provided, however, that if a signatory is a party to an international undertaking on 
official export credits to which at least twelve original signatories to this Agreement are 
parties as of I January 1979 (or a successor undertaking which has been adopted by those 
original signatories), or if in practice a signatory applies the interest rates provisions of the 
relevant undertaking, an export credit practice which is in conformity with those provisions 
shall not be considered an export subsidy prohibited by this Agreement. 
(I) Any other charge on the public account constituting an export subsidy in the sense of 
Article XVI of the General Agreement. 
Subsidies Code, supra note 12, annex, 31 U.S.T. at 546 (footnotes omitted). 
36. Id. art. 11:1, 31 V.S.T. at 532. 
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and this should be done, through consultations, in conformity with 
the spirit of Article XVI:5 of the General Agreement.37 
On the other hand, Article 11 admonishes signatories to refrain from 
using domestic subsidies when to do so causes or threatens to cause injury 
to another signatory's domestic industry.38 Article 11 concludes with the 
disclaimer that "nothing in paragraphs 1-3 above and in particular the 
enumeration of forms of subsidies creates, in itself, any basis for action 
under the General Agreement, as interpreted by this Agreement."39 
In sum, although SIMA directs the Deputy Minister to take Article 11 
"fully into account" when administering the countervailing duty provi-
sions of the Act, exactly what SIMA's charge means in the context of 
domestic subsidies is far from clear. Any number of glosses could be 
placed on Article 11 given its lack of a hard and sharp legal edge. The 
Deputy Minister certainly has been vested with a broad grant of discre-
tion under section 2(5) of SIMA, leaving it within his power to find a 
myriad of foreign government programs to be unlawful subsidies or, con-
versely, permissible practices, using Article 11 of the Subsidies Code as his 
guide. The extent to which Article 11 qualifies SIMA's sweeping defini-
tion of "subsidy" must in the end turn upon administrative practice. 
Determining the Amount of the Subsidy 
If the Deputy Minister does determine that an unlawful subsidy has 
been bestowed on imported goods that are the subject of a CVD investiga-
tion, he still has the power to mitigate (or aggravate, depending on a 
party's posture in the investigation) the impact of that determination in at 
least two ways. The first is through the Deputy Minister's power to de-
termine the amount of the subsidy, the second through his power to settle 
CVD investigations by concluding an undertaking with the exporter of 
the subject merchandise. 
Once he has concluded that imports that are the subject of a CVD in-
vestigation have received a prohibited subsidy, the Deputy Minister's next 
task is to calculate the amount of that subsidy. For all interested parties 
this is a critical stage of the proceeding since a de minimis margin will 
result in termination of the CVD investigation.40 SIMA defines "amount 
of the subsidy" as: 
37. !d. art. 11:3,31 U.ST. at 533-34. 
38. [d. art. 11:2, 31 U.S.T. at 533. 
39. [d. art. 11 :4, 31 U.S.T. at 534. 
40. SIMA, supra note 14, § 35(1). 
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(a) the amount of the subsidy on the goods determined and ad-
justed in the prescribed manner, or 
(b) where the manner of determining the amount of the subsidy 
has not been prescribed or, in the opinion of the Deputy Minister, 
sufficient information has not been furnished or is not available to 
enable the determination of the amount of the subsidy in the pre-
scribed manner, the amount of the subsidy on the goods deter-
mined and adjusted in such manner as the Minister specifies.u 
Less than a year after SIMA's passage the Department of National 
Revenue promulgated regulations prescribing the price adjustments to be 
made in dumping cases and the manner of determining the amount of a 
subsidy in CVD investigations.42 These Special Import Measures Regula-
tions detail the methodology used by the Deputy Minister in calculating 
grants; loans at a preferential rate; income tax credits, refunds, and ex-
emptions; the deferral of income taxes; the over-refund of indirect taxes; 
and the value of goods or services provided by a foreign government to an 
exporter.43 By issuing these detailed regulations,H the Department of Na-
tional Revenue circumscribed the discretion which SIMA gave the Deputy 
Minister in calculating the amount of a subsidy, and in the process pro-
41. ld. § 2(1). 
42. Special Import Measures Regulations, Reg. No. SOR/84-927, 118 Can. Gaz. (Part II) 4286 
(Min. Fin. 1984). 
43. Id. §§ 27-36. 
44. For example, section 27 of the Special Import Measures Regulations, entitled "Grant," 
provides: 
Where the subsidy in relation to any subsidized goods is in the form of a grant, the 
amount of the subsidy shall be determined by distributing, in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles, the amount of the grant over 
(a) where the grant was, or is, to be used for operating expenses in the production, 
purchase, distribution, transportation, sale, export or import of subsidized goods, the esti-
mated total quantity of subsidized goods to which the grant is attributable; 
(b) where the grant was, or is, to be used for the purchase or construction of a fixed 
asset, the estimated total quantity of subsidized goods the production, purchase, distribu-
tion, transportation, sale, export or import of which the fixed asset was, or will be, used 
over the anticipated useful life of the fixed asset; 
(c) where the use of the grant was, or is, not for the purposes described in paragraph (a) 
or (b) or is unknown, the estimated total quantity of subsidized goods the production, 
purchase, distribution, transportation, sale, export or import of which was, or will be, car-
ried out by the person who received the grant during the weighted average useful life, not 
exceeding ten years, of fixed assets used by the industry of that person. 
Id. § 27. Thus, although the regulation is fairly detailed, it necessarily allows for estimates by the 
Deputy Minister when making his calculations. 
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moted rational decision making. 
Undertakings 
The primary vehicle for terminating a CVD investigation is a price 
undertaking which is in effect a settlement between the Deputy Minister 
and the exporter of the goods under investigation.46 An undertaking may 
only be concluded by Jhe Deputy Minister where four prerequisites are 
met. First, the Deputy Minister must believe that an undertaking will 
eliminate either the subsidy or the material injury that is likely to be 
caused by the subsidizing."f6 Second, the Deputy Minister may not enter 
into an undertaking unless he believes that the undertaking will not cause 
the price of the subsidized goods to increase by more than the estimated 
amount of the subsidy.47 Third, an undertaking may not be accepted after 
a preliminary determination of subsidizing has been reached.48 Fourth, 
the Deputy Minister must be of the opinion that administering the under-
taking will be practicable.49 
The substantive content of an undertaking is left to the Deputy Minis-
ter and the exporter of the subsidized good to hammer out. SIMA's defi-
nition of "undertaking" provides the only statutory direction for the Dep-
uty Minister as to what is minimally acceptable: 
(i) an undertaking given by an exporter who accounts for, or un-
dertakings given individually by exporters who account for, all or 
substantially all the exports to Canada of the subsidized goods, 
where the exporter or each exporter, as the case may be, 
(A) has the consent of the government of the country of export 
of the goods to give the undertaking, and 
(B) undertakes to revise, in the manner specified in his under-
taking, the price at which he sells the goods to importers in Ca-
nada, or 
(ii) an undertaking given by the government of a country that ac-
counts for, or undertakings given by the governments of countries 
that account for, all or substantially all the exports to Canada of 
45. See SIMA, supra note 14, §§ 49-54. 
46. Id. § 49(1 )(a), (b). 
47. Id. § 49(2)(a). 
48. Id. § 49(2)(b). According to Professor Robert K. Paterson, "This time frame appears to be 
aimed at avoiding the costs of an injury inquiry and providing an incentive for early agreement." R. 
PAn:RSON, CANADIAN REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 145 n.213 
(1986) [hereinafter Paterson]. 
49. SIMA, supra note 14, § 49(2)(c). 
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the subsidized goods where the country or each country, as the 
case may be, undertakes in its undertaking 
(A) to eliminate the subsidy on goods exported to Canada from 
that country, 
(B) to limit the amount of the subsidy on goods exported to 
Canada from that country, 
(C) to limit the quantity of the goods to be exported to Canada 
from that country, or 
(D) otherwise to eliminate the effect of the subsidizing on the 
production in Canada of like goods, in the manner specified in its 
undertaking. llo 
In contrast to the U.S. CVD law,lIl SIMA does not instruct the Deputy 
Minister to consider the interests of the domestic industry or consumers 
when entering into an undertaking. If an undertaking is accepted, it must 
be reviewed within three years from the date the Deputy Minister ac-
cepted it.1I2 The undertaking may be renewed for an additional period of 
not more than three years if "the undertaking continues to serve the pur-
pose for which it was intended."113 
The Domestic Industry and "Like Goods" 
Regarding the imported goods which are the focus of a CVD investiga-
tion, the Deputy Minister is given the responsibility for "specifying the 
goods to which the preliminary [and final] determination applies."II" Sec-
tion 42(1)(a) mandates that the Import Tribunal investigate the issue of 
injury "in the case of any goods to which the preliminary determination 
applies," thereby setting limits on the scope of the Tribunal's investiga-
tion.1I1I With the Deputy Minister's scope determination thus serving as 
the outer limit of the Tribunal's investigation, the Tribunal for its part 
must assess the impact, as determined by the Deputy Minister, of those 
subsidized goods on the "like goods," Le., domestically produced goods 
that are identical in all respects with the subsidized goods or, absent iden-
tical goods, domestically-produced goods that resemble the subsidized 
goods in terms of use and other characteristics. liS Imported and domestic 
50. Id. § 2(1). 
51. See infra notes 140-141 and accompanying text. 
52. SIMA, supra note 14, § 53(1). 
53. /d. § 53(1 )(a). 
54. Id. § 38(1)(b)(ii), 41 (1)(a)(iv)(A). 
55. /d. § 42(1 )(a). 
56. "Like goods" means "in relation to any other goods, ... (a) goods that are identical in all 
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goods have been found to be similar, for example, based on whether they 
are directly competitive, whether they serve the same end use, and 
whether they are fungible. 57 
In determining the scope of a CVD order, SIMA has no requirement 
that either the Deputy Minister or the Import Tribunal determine what 
the affected domestic industry is in a CVD case. Instead, issues of scope 
are handled through SIMA's definition of "material injury," whose focus 
is injury "to the production in Canada of like goods."58 Section 42(3) of 
SIMA instructs the Tribunal, "in considering any question relating to the 
production in Canada of any goods or the establishment in Canada of that 
production" to take fully into account (1) the definition of "domestic in-
dustry" found in Article 4:1 of the GATT Antidumping Code,59 which 
includes a special rule for regional industries, and (2) the provision for 
regional industries contained in Article 6:7 of the Subsidies Code.60 The 
lacuna that exists in section 42(3) is the omission of any references to the 
Subsidy Code's definition of "domestic industry" contained in Article 6:5 
which tracks the Antidumping Code's definition.61 Whether or not this 
lack of parallelism was an oversight, this asymmetry in the "domestic in-
dustry" criterion means that there is no statutory direction in SIMA to 
address injury determinations in CVD and antidumping cases in exactly 
the same way. This is in marked contrast to the practice under the U.S. 
respects to the other goods, or (b) in the absence of any goods described in paragraph (a), goods the 
uses and other characteristics of which closely resemble those of the other goods." [d. § 2(1). 
57. See, e.g., Sarco Canada, Ltd. v. Anti-Dumping Tribunal, I F.C. 247 (C.A. 1979). 
58. SIMA, supra note 14, § 2(1). See also infra notes 63-71 and accompanying text. 
59. SIMA, supra note 14, § 42(3)(a). "Domestic industry" is defined in the GATT Antidump-
ing Code in part as "the domestic producers as a whole of the like products or to those of them whose 
collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of 
those products." Antidumping Code, supra note 11, art. 4(1), 31 V.S.T. at 4927. 
60. SIMA, supra note 14, § 42(3)(b). Article 6:7 of the Subsidies Code provides: 
In exceptional circumstances the territory of a signatory may, for the production in ques-
tion, be divided into two or more competitive markets and the producers within each mar-
ket may be regarded as a separate industry if (a) the producers within such market sell all 
or almost all of their production of the product in question in that market, and (b) the 
demand in that market is not to any substantial degree supplied by producers of the 
prodcut in question located elsewhere in the territory. In such circumstances, injury may be 
found to exist even where a major portion of the total domestic industry is not injured 
provided there is a concentration of subsidized imports into such an isolated market and 
provided further that the subsidized imports are causing injury to the producers of all or 
almost all of the production within such market. 
Subsidies Code, supra note 12, art. 6:7, 31 U.S.T. at 528-529. 
61. Jd. art. 6(5), 31 U.S.T. at 528. 
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CVD law.62 
Material Injury and Causation 
While the role of the Deputy Minister is to determine whether im-
ported goods are being subsidized and whether there is a reasonable indi-
cation that those subsidized goods are a cause of material injury, the task 
falls to the Canadian Import Tribunal to determine whether the subsidi-
zation of the subject imports has caused, is causing or is likely to cause 
material injury or has caused or is causing retardation.63 The Import Tri-
bunal makes just one injury finding, unlike the two-stage preliminary and 
final subsidy determination by the Deputy Minister." The Tribunal must 
make its finding within 120 days after receipt of the Deputy Minister's 
preliminary determination of subsidization, and publish its reasons fifteen 
days thereafter.6~ 
Other than its tautological definitions of material injury66 and retarda-
tion,67 SIMA contains no injury or causation guidelines. The Tribunal 
has promulgated regulations which put some flesh on SIMA's bare bones 
by identifying three factors the Tribunal will consider when addressing 
the questions of injury and causation.ss Under Rule 36 of the Canadian 
Import Tribunal Rules,69 the Tribunal will examine import volume, price 
effects, the impact on domestic production of subsidized goods, and "such 
62. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4) (1982), which gives a definition for "industry" applicable to both 
antidumping and CVD cases. 
63. SIMA, supra note 14, § 42(1 )(a)(i). 
64. [d. § 43(1). 
65. [d. § 43(1), (2)(b). 
66. "Material injury" is defined as "material injury to the production in Canada of like goods, 
and includes, in respect only of the subsidizing of an agricultural product, an increase in the financial 
burden on a federal or provincial government agricultural support program in Canada." [d. § 2(1). 
67. "Retardation" is defined as "material retardation of the establishment of the production in 
Canada of like goods." [d. 
[d. 
68. See PATERSON, supra note 48, at 116-17, where the author summarizes: 
A typical injury inquiry will consider loss of market share and profit, underutilization of 
capacity, loss of employment, price erosion, cancelled or postponed expansion, high inven-
tories, higher distribution costs and reduced research and development activity. . . . 
... However, the Tribunal has yet to develop a clear, predictable concept of the neces-
sary causal connection between dumping [and subsidization] and injury, concentrating in-
stead on factors relevant to the allegation of injury itself. 
69. Canadian Import Tribunal Rules, Reg. No. SORj85-1068, 119 Can. Gaz. (Part II) 4652 
(Min. Fin. 1985). 
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other matters as may be relevant to the inquiry."70 
Finally, although SIMA makes no provision for consideration of public 
interest factors when an undertaking is accepted by the Deputy Minister, 
after the Import Tribunal makes an affirmative injury finding, section 
45(1) of the Act gives the Tribunal the authority to make an inquiry into 
whether "the imposition of an antidumping or countervailing duty ... in 
the full amount ... would not or might not be in the public interest," and 
to report its conclusion with supporting rationale to the Minister of Fi-
nance who is empowered to take action in response to the Tribunal's rec-
70. Id. Rule 36(a), (d). Rule 36 states: 
Parties to an inquiry respecting the dumping or subsidizing of goods should, in the sub-
missions and evidence that they present to the Tribunal, take into account that, in consider-
ing any issue of material injury or retardation, the Tribunal 
(a) will wish to be informed about and will examine 
(i) the actual and potential volume of the dumped or subsidized goods imported into 
Canada, 
(ii) the effect of the dumped or subsidized goods on the prices of like goods in the domes-
tic market, and 
(iii) the impact of the dumped or subsidized goods on the production of like goods in 
Canada; 
(b) will, in relation to the factors mentioned in subparagraphs (a)(i) and (ii), consider 
(i) whether there has been a significant increase in the importation into Canada of the 
dumped or subsidized goods, either absolutely or relative to the production or consumption 
in Canada of like goods, 
(ii) whether the prices of the dumped or subsidized goods imported into Canada have 
significantly undercut the prices of like goods produced and sold in Canada, and 
(iii) whether the effect of the importation into Canada of the dumped or subsidized 
goods has been 
(A) to depress significantly the prices of like goods produced and sold in Canada, or 
(B) to limit to a significant degree increases in the prices of like goods produced and sold 
in Canada; 
(c) will, in relation to the factor mentioned in subparagraph (a)(iii), consider all relevant 
economic factors and indices that have a bearing on the industry that comprises or includes 
the like goods, including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, 
(i) actual and potential decline in output, sales, market share, profits, productivity, re-
turn on investments or utilization of capacity, 
(ii) factors affecting domestic prices, 
(iii) actual and potential negative affects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, 
growth, ability to raise capital or investments and, in the case of subsidizing of an agricul-
tural product, whether there has been an increase in the financial burden on a federal or 
provincial government agricultural support program in Canada; and 
(d) will consider such other matters as may be relevant to the inquiry. 
Id. Some commentators have concluded that a domestic industry fairs better before the Tribunal on 
the question of likelihood of injury than it does when present injury is considered by the Tribunal. See 
PATERSON, supra note 48, at 117. 
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ommendation.71 Section 45(1) thus recognizes that although the imposition 
of an antidumping or countervailing duty might be in the best interests of 
the adversely affected domestic industry, frequently broader and overrid-
ing interests are at stake, not only of consumers but also of other domestic 
industries which purchase the imported goods and incorporate or other-
wise use them in their own production and manufacturing processes. 
Thus, for example, if the complaining domestic industry is an oligopoly, 
removing the antidumping or countervailing duty on imported goods in 
order to maintain domestic price competition might be preferable to keep-
ing the countervailing duty in place. 
With the brief review of the Canadian CVD law as backdrop, the next 
part of this article compares the U.S. CVD legislation. As will be seen, 
the two laws closely parallel each other. 
The U.S. Countervailing Duty Law 
In response to the GATT Subsidies Code, the U.S. CVD law was over-
hauled with the enactment of the Trade Agreements' Act of 1979 (TAA or 
1979 Act).'2 The agencies charged with the responsibility for administer-
ing the antidumping and CVD provisions of the 1979 Act are the Interna-
tional Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce (ITA) and 
the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC or Commis~ion).78 The 
1979 Act works in tandem with the predecessor statute, the Tariff Act of 
1930, also known as the Smoot-Hawley Act.'· Countervailing duty inves-
tigations involving countries which are signatories to the GATT Subsidies 
Code, or which have made commitments to the United States comparable 
to those contained in the Subsidies Code, are conducted under the 1979 
Act.'11 All other CVD investigations are conducted under the Tariff Act of 
71. SIMA, supra note 14, § 45(1). See PATERSON, supra note 48, at 125 n.117. See also infra 
notes 299-309 and accompanying text, discussing the Import Tribunal's first invocation of § 45 in the 
Grain Corn decision. 
72. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.). 
698 
73. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1671f. 
74. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ t303-1677g (1982 & Supp. IJI 1986). 
75. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)-(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). That section provides: 
(a) General rule 
H-
(1) the administering authority [the International Trade Administration, Department of 
CommerceJ determines that-
(A) a country under the Agreement, or 
(B) a person who is a citizen or national of such a country, or a corporation, association, 
or other organization organized in such a country, is providing, directly or indirectly, a 
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1930.76 The major difference between the two proceedings IS the require-
Id. 
subsidy with respect \0 the manufacture, production, or exportation of a class or kind of 
merchandise imported, or sold (or likely to be sold) for importation, into the United States, 
and 
(2) the IInternational Trade] Commission determines that-
(A) an industry in the United States-
(i) is materially injured, or 
(ii) is threatened with material injury, or 
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded, 
by reason of imports of that merchandise or by reason of sales (or the likelihood of sales) of 
that merchandise for importation, 
then there shall be imposed upon such merchandise a countervailing duty, in addition to 
any other duty imposed, equal to the amount of the net subsidy. For purposes of this 
subsection and section 1671d(b)(1) of this title, a reference to the sale of merchandise in-
cludes the entering into of any leasing arrangement regarding the merchandise that is 
equivalent to the sale of the merchandise. 
(b) Country under the Agreement 
For purposes of this part, the term "country under the Agreement" means a country-
(1) between the United States and which the Agreement on Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures Ithe Subsidies Code applies, as determined under section 2503(b) of this 
title, 
(2) which has assumed obligations with respect to the United Slates which are substan-
tially equivalent to o~ligations under the Agreement, as determined by the President, or 
(3) with respect to which the President determines that-
(A) there is an agreement in effect between the United States and that country which-
(i) was in force on June 19, 1979, and 
(ii) requires unconditional most-favored-nation treatment with respect to articles im-
ported into the United States, 
(B) the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade does not apply between the United 
States and that country, and 
(C) the agreement described in subparagraph (A) does not expressly permit-
(i) actions required or permilted by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or 
req uired by the Congress, or 
(ii) nondiscriminatory prohibitions or restrictions on importation which are designed to 
prevent deceptive or unfair practices. 
76. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(1) (1982). Section 1303(a)(1) provides: 
Except in the case of an article or merchandise which is the product of a country under the 
Agreement (within the meaning of section 1671(b) of this title), whenever any country, 
dependency, colony, province, or other political subdivision of government, person, partner-
ship, association, cartel, or corporation, shall payor bestow, directly or indirectly, any 
bounty or grant upon the manufacture or production or export of any article or merchan-
dise manufactured or produced in such country, dependency, colony, province, or other 
political subdivision of government, then upon the importation of such article or merchan-
dise into the United States, whether the same shall be imported directly from the country 
of production or otherwise, and whether such article or merchandise is imported in the 
same condition as when exported from the country of production or has been changed in 
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ment under the TAA of a finding of material injury to a domestic injury 
before a countervailing duty may be imposed. In contrast, no showing of 
injury is required under the CVD provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930, 
unless the imported merchandise is a duty-free item, in which case the 
Commission must make an affirmative injury finding before a counter-
vailing duty may be assessed. 77 
The similarities between the Canadian and U.S. CVD procedures are 
striking. In broad brush, the ITA determines whether imported goods 
have received an unlawful subsidy, while the ITC investigates the ques-
tion of material injury to a domestic industry caused by such imports. Not 
only have parallel administrative agencies thus been set up in each coun-
try, but the functions each agency performs in its respective country are 
virtually identical as well. Relevant statutory time· periods, criteria for 
successfully prosecuting a CVD case, and statutory definitions also match 
closely. Much of this similarity may be attributed, of course, to the Subsi-
dies Code to which both Canada and the United States made reference 
when revising their CVD statutes. For example, the two-stage injury and 
subsidization determination scheme can be traced back to the Code.78 
However, terms such as "material injury" and "reasonable indication of 
injury" will not be found in the Code, and yet both terms appear in the 
Canadian and U.S. CVD laws. Considering that the 1979 U.S. CVD law 
is four years older than its Canadian counterpart, the Canadian Parlia-
ment may have borrowed from the U.S. Congress when it drafted SIMA. 
In any event, it is clear that both national legislatures drew heavily from 
the Subsidies Code itself when drafting their respective CVD legislation. 
Procedure 
Although the Secretary of Commerce has the authority to self-initiate a 
CVD investigation,79 in practice CVD investigations are commenced by 
private petition.80 Four persons qualify as an "interested party" with 
Jd. 
condition by remanufacture or otherwise, there shall be levied and paid, in all such cases, 
in addition to any duties otherwise imposed, a duty equal to the net amount of such bounty 
or grant, however the same be paid or bestowed. 
77. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(2). 
78. See Subsidies Code, supra note 12, art. 2. 
79. 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Nevertheless, unless an injured party comes 
forward, the IT A is not likely to self-initiate where injury must be shown to the satisfaction of the 
Commission. 
80. 19 U.S.C. § 1671 a(b). For an overview of the Commerce Department's procedures in an-
tidumping and CVD cases, see Horlick & DeBusk, Commerce Procedures Under Existing and Pro-
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standing to file a petition: (1) a manufacturer, producer or wholesaler in 
the United States of a like product, (2) a union which is representative of 
the industry or of sellers in the United States of a like product, (3) a trade 
or business association, a majority of whose members manufacture, pro-
duce or wholesale in the United States a like product, and (4) an associa-
tion, a majority of whose members is drawn from the three preceding 
categories of "interested party."81 Although in theory the U.S. CVD legis-
lation accords fewer persons standing to bring CVD cases than does the 
Canadian CVD law, in practice it would be exceedingly rare for anyone 
outside these four groups to have either sufficient interest or the financial 
resources to initiate and prosecute such a proceeding. 
A CVD petition must be filed simultaneously with the ITA and the 
Commission.82 The ITA has twenty days within which to evaluate the 
sufficiency of the petition,83 one day less than the ITA's Canadian coun-
terpart, the Deputy Minister.84 If the petition is deemed adequate, the 
ITA commences an investigation forthwith. 811 Within eighty-five days of 
the filing of the petition it must make a preliminary subsidy determina-
tion.86 This time period may be extended by an additional sixty-five days 
in extraordinarily complicated cases,87 comparable to the forty-five day 
extension available to the Deputy Minister in similar cases.88 Absent an 
unusually complicated CVD case, the comparable time period for the 
Deputy Minister to make his preliminary determination is 141 days (21 
days to evaluate the complaint,89 30 days from that date to commence an 
investigation,90 and 90 days from that date to reach a preliminary deter-
mination).91 The longer time period that SIMA gives the Deputy Minis-
ter to reach his preliminary determination can be explained in part by the 
additional finding of a reasonable indication of injury that the Deputy 
Minister must make in the first instance,92 a finding that in the United 
States the ITC makes exdusively.93 In fact, under the U.S. CVD law, the 
posed AntidumpinglCounteroailing Duty Regulations. 22 INT'1. LAW. 99 (1988). 
81. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(b), 1677(9) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
82. Id. § 1671a(b)(2). 
83. Id. § 1671a(c). 
84. SIMA, supra note 14, § 32( I). 
85. 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(c)(2). 
86. Id. § 1671 b(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
87. Id. § 1671b(c). 
88. SIMA, supra note 14. § 39. 
89. Id. § 32(1). 
90. Id. § 31(1). 
91. Id. § 38(1). 
92. Id. § 31(1)(b). 
93. 19 U.S.C. § 1671 b(a). 
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Commission is given forty-five days from the date the petition is filed 
within which to makes its reasonable-indication-of-injury determination.B4 
If the Commission's preliminary injury determination is affirmative and 
the case proceeds, it must make its final injury determination before the 
120th day after the day the ITA makes its affirmative preliminary deter-
mination or the 45th day after the day the ITA makes its affirmative final 
determination, whichever has occurred later.9& The analogous time frame 
for the Import Tribunal is virtually identical: it has 120 days from the 
receipt of the Deputy Minister's preliminary injury determination within 
which to issue its final injury finding and an additional 15 days within 
which to publish its statement of reasons.BS If the U.S. case is not termi-
nated but moves on to the final determination of subsidization, the ITA 
has seventy-five days from the date of its preliminary determination to 
issue its final determination.B7 The Deputy Minister has ninety days from 
the date of his preliminary determination to make his final 
determination. B8 
Unlike the Canadian practice of terminating an investigation if the 
Deputy Minister reaches a negative preliminary subsidization determina-
tion,BB if the ITA reaches a negative preliminary determination of subsidi-
zation the investigation nevertheless continues to the final countervailing 
duty determination stage, provided the ITC reaches an affirmative prelim-
inary determination that there is a reasonable indication that a domestic 
industry is materially injured or is threatened with material injury by rea-
son of the subject imports. loo At least one commentator has suggested that 
this difference in the Canadian law may lead to more affirmative prelimi-
nary determinations by the Deputy Minister, even in cases with a weak 
evidentiary base, in order to give the parties and the agency more time 
within which to gather necessary proofs. lol 
If the Commission's preliminary injury determination is negative, the 
investigation is terminated. lOB Although a formal difference exists between 
the Canadian practice of having a one-step injury investigation by the Im-
port Tribunal and the two-phase preliminary and final injury determina-
tions by the Commission, substantively Canada does conduct a comparable 
94. Id. 
95. 19 U.S.C. § 167Id(b)(2). 
96. SIMA, supra note 14, § 43. 
97. 19 u.S.C. § I 67Id(a)(1). 
98. SIMA, supra note 14, § 41 (I). 
99. /d. § 35(1). 
100. 19 U.S.C. § 167Ib(a). 
101. PATt:RSON, supra note 48, at 110. 
102. 19 U.S.C. § 167Ib(a). 
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two-stage injury determination but through two different agencies. loa 
However, the questions of subsidization and injury are examined concur-
rently in both countries, the suggested practice in Article 2:4 of the Subsi-
dies Code: "Upon initiation of an investigation and thereafter, the evi-
dence of both a subsidy and injury caused thereby should be considered 
simultaneously."lo4 Indeed, the Canadian practice of having the Deputy 
Minister make the initial determination both of subsidization and of rea-
sonable indication of injury is arguably more consistent with the require-
ment in Article 2 of the Subsidies Code that "the evidence of both the 
existence of subsidy and injury shall be considered simultaneously (a) in 
the decision whether or not to initiate an investigation,"lo6 than is the 
U.S. practice of having two agencies address those issues only after the 
decision to initiate the CVD investigation has been made. 
The TAA's Definition of "Subsidy" 
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 provides a slightly more detailed 
definition of "subsidy" than does SIMA, narrowing the scope of what 
constitutes a countervailable subsidy: 
The term "subsidy" has the same meaning as the term "bounty or 
grant" as that term is used in section 1303 of this title [19 U.S.C. 
§ 1303], and includes, but is not limited to, the following: 
(A) Any export subsidy described in Annex A to the Agree-
mentl06 (relating to illustrative list of export subsidies). 
(B) The following domestic subsidies, if provided or required 
by government action to a specific enterprise or industry, or group 
of enterprises or industries, whether publicly or privately owned, 
and whether paid or bestowed directly or indirectly on the manu-
facture, production, or export of any class or kind of merchandise: 
(i) the provision of capital, loans, or loan guarantees on terms 
inconsistent with commercial considerations. 
(ii) The provision of goods or services at preferential rates. 
103. PATERSON, supra note 48, at 108. Moreover, in the event of a negative reasonable indica-
tion of injury determination by the Deputy Minister, the question may still be referred to the Import 
Tribunal for its consideration. SIMA, supra note 14, § 33(2). 
104. Subsidies Code, supra note 12, art. 2(4), 31 U.S.T. at 520. 
105. [d. 
106. The reference to "Annex A to the Agreement" is to the Annex to the Subsidies Code, 
reproduced supra at note 35. The Tokyo Round negotiators contemplated having two annexes to the 
Subsidies Code, one dealing with export subsidies and the other with domestic subsidies. In the end 
the negotiators appended just one annex to that code, being unable to reach agreement on a domestic 
subsidies annex. 
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(iii) The grant of funds or forgiveness of debt to cover operating 
losses sustained by a specific industry. 
(iv) The assumption of any costs or expenses of manufacture, 
production, or distribution. lo7 
Items (i) through (iv) closely parallel the Special Import Measures 
Regulation on subsidies promulgated by the Canadian Department of N a-
tional Revenue. loe Added to this non-exhaustive list of what constitutes a 
subsidy was a 1984 amendment to the T AA covering upstream subsidies: 
The term "upstream subsidy" means any subsidy described in 
section 1677(S)(B)(i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) of this title by the govern-
ment of a country that-
(1) is paid or bestowed by that government with respect to a prod-
uct (hereinafter referred to as an "input product") that is used in 
the manufacture or production in that country of merchandise 
which is the subject of a countervailing duty proceeding; 
(2) in the judgment of the administering authority bestows a com-
petitive benefit on the merchandise; and 
(3) has a significant effect on the cost of manufacturing or produc-
ing the merchandise. loe 
Although more detailed than SIMA's upstream subsidy provision,llo 
the ITA and the Deputy Minister are both vested with extensive discre-
tion in dealing with an upstream subsidy issue. The ITA is specifically 
provided discretion in section 1677-1 (a), 111 and the Deputy Minister is 
granted discretion under SIMA's definition of "amount of the subsidy" 
("where the manner of determining the amount of the subsidy has not 
been prescribed ... , the amount of the subsidy on the goods [shall be] 
determined and adjusted in such manner as the Minister specifies").1l2 A 
U.S. CVD proceeding that includes an upstream subsidy investigation 
may be extended beyond the normal 8S-day period for reaching a prelimi-
nary determination up to 2S0 days after the date for filing of the petition 
107. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1982). 
108. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. 
109. 19 U.S.C. § 1677-1(a) (1982 & Supp. II 1984). This subsection concludes, "[i]n applying 
this subsection, an association of two or more foreign countries, political subdivisions, dependent terri-
tories, or possessions of foreign countries organized into a customs union outside the United States 
shall be treated as being one country if the subsidy is provided by the customs union." Id. 
110. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. 
111. 19 U.S.C. § 1677-1(a). 
112. SIMA, supra note 14, § 2(1). 
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(310 days in cases declared to be extraordinarily complicated).l13 
The legal effect of either an ITA affirmative preliminary determination 
or a Revenue Canada affirmative preliminary determination is the same. 
On all entries of the subject goods imported after the date of the prelimi-
nary determination the importer must pay an estimated countervailing 
duty or post security in the amount of the estimated duty.114(In Canada 
this estimated duty is called a provisional duty.) Under ordinary circum-
stances the imposition of countervailing duties is prospective only. How-
ever, Canada and the United States have both made provision for the 
ninety-day retroactive assessment of countervailing duties in cases involv-
113. 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(g). 
114. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 provides: 
Effect of determination by the administering authority: 
If the preliminary determination of the administering authority under subsection (b) of this 
section [19 U.S.C. § 1671b(b)] is affirmative, the administering authority-
(1) shall order the suspension of liquidation of all entries of merchandise subject to the 
determination which are entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption on or 
after the date of publication of the notice of the determination in the Federal Register, 
(2) shall order the posting of a cash deposit, bond, or other security, as it deems appro-
priate, for each entry of the merchandise concerned equal to the estimated amount of the 
net subsidy, and 
(3) shall make available to the Commission all information upon which its determination 
was based and which the Commission considers relevant to its injury determination 
19 U.S.C. § 1671 b(d) (1982). 
The analogous provision in SIMA provides: 
Provisional Duty 
(1) Where the Deputy Minister makes a preliminary determination of dumping or subsi-
dizing in an investigation under this Act, the importer of dumped or subsidized goods that 
are of the same description as any goods to which the preliminary determination applies 
and that are released during the period commencing on the day the preliminary determina-
tion is made . . . 
shall, on demand of the Deputy Minister for payment of provisional duty on the imported 
goods, 
(c) payor cause to be paid on the imported goods provisional duty in an amount not 
greater than the estimated margin of dumping of or the estimated amount of the subsidy 
on the imported goods, or 
(d) post or cause to be posted security in a prescribed form and in an amount or to a 
value not greater than the estimated margin of dumping of or the estimated amount of 
the subsidy on the imported goods, 
at the option of the importer. 
SIMA, supra note 14, § 8(1). 
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ing a massive importation of subsidized goods, lUi In Canada this determi-
nation is made by the Import Tribunal, in the United States by the ITA. 
The rationale for this provision is to discourage an importer from either 
bringing in large quantities of the subject merchandise during the prelimi-
nary investigation phase and thereby avoiding the imposition of counter-
vailing duties on those imports, or from entering goods sporadically but on 
a massive basis in order to maintain inventory levels for a considerable 
length of time while at the same time avoiding countervailing duties alto-
115. The relevant SIMA section provides: 
Where any subsidy on subsidized goods is an export subsidy, there shall be levied, collected 
and paid on all such subsidized goods imported into Canada 
(a) in respect of which the Tribunal has made an order or finding, after the release of 
the goods, that 
(i) material injury has been caused by reason of the fact that the imported goods 
(A) constitute a massive importation into Canada, or 
(B) form part of a series of importations into Canada, which importations in the aggre-
gate are massive and have occurred within a relatively short period of time, and 
(ii) a countervailing duty should be imposed on such subsidized goods in order to prevent 
the recurrence of such material injury, 
(b) that were released during the period of 90 days preceding the day on which the 
Deputy Minister made a preliminary determination of subsidizing in respect of the 
goods or goods of that descri ption, and 
(c) in respect of which the Deputy Minister has made a specification pursuant to clause 
4I(1)(a)(iv)(C) [that the subsidized goods have received an unlawful export subsidyl, a 
couniervailing duty in an amount equal to such of the amount of the subsidy on the 
imported goods as is an expori subsidy. 
SIMA, supra note 14, § 6. 
The U.S. law provides: 
Critical circumstances determinations 
(1) In general.-If a petitioner alleges critical circumstances in its original petition,' or by 
amendment at any time more than 20 days before the date of a final determination by the 
administering authority, then the administering authority shall promptly determine, on the 
basis of the best information available to it at that time, whether there is a reasonable basis 
to believe or suspect that-
(A) the alleged subsidy is inconsistent with the Agreement, and 
(B) there have been massive imports of the class or kind of merchandise which is the 
subject of the investigation over a relatively short period. 
(2) Suspension of liquidation.- If the determination of the administering authority under 
paragraph (1) is affirmative, then any suspension of liquidation ordered under subsection 
(d)(1) of this section shall apply, or, if notice of such suspension of liquidation is already 
published, be amended to apply, to unliquidated entries of merchandise entered, or with-
drawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after the date which is 90 days before the 
date on which suspension of liquidation was first ordered. 
19 U.S.C. § 167Ib(e) (1982). 
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gether insofar as the massive imports are concerned. 
In enacting their respective critical circumstances provision both coun-
tries took their cue from Article 5:9 of the Subsidies Code.1l6 In Canada 
the unlawful subsidy must be an export subsidy in order for the retroac-
tive assessment of duties to apply. The U.S. critical circumstances provi-
sion is not so limited by its terms. To the extent the U.S. law is applied to 
domestic as well as export subsidies it is in violation of the Subsidies Code 
which limits the retroactive assessment of countervailing duties to cases 
involving an export subsidy.1l7 
In the event that either an undertaking or settlement agreement cannot 
be reached and a CVD order instead is issued, both countries' statutes 
provide for periodic administrative review and revocation of CVD orders, 
in compliance with Article 4:9 of the Subsidies Code which permits a 
CVD order to remain in effect "only as long as, and to the extent neces-
sary to counteract the subsidization which is causing injury."1l8 In Ca-
nada, section 76(2) of SIMA authorizes the Import Tribunal to review its 
findings and orders, which it will usually do within three years after a 
CVD order has issued.1l9 SIMA also contains a sunset provision that in 
effect revokes all Tribunal injury findings after five years, unless sooner 
reviewed and extended.12O Section 751 of the U.S. CVD law likewise pro-
vides for periodic review and revocation of CVD orders by either the ITA 
or the Commission. l2l Periodic review takes place annuallyl22 by the ITA, 
116. Article 5(9) of the Subsidies Code provides: 
In critical circumstances where for the subsidized product in question the authorities find 
that injury which is difficult to repair is caused by massive imports in a relatively short 
period of a product benefiting from export subsidies paid or bestowed inconsistently with 
the provisions of the General Agreement and of this Agreement and where it is deemed 
necessary, in order to preclude the recurrence of such injury, to assess countervailing duties 
retroactively on those imports, the definitive countervailing duties may be assessed on im-
ports which were entered for consumption not more than ninety days prior to the date of 
application of provisional measures. 
Subsidies Code, supra note 12, art. 5(9), 31 U.S.T. at 526. 
117. Id. art. 5, 31 U.S.T. at 525-526. Although the U.S. critical circumstances provision does 
not require a determination that injury has resulted from those massive imports, presumably the ITC 
will have made an affirmative preliminary injury determination by the time the ITA reaches its 
critical circumstances decision, given that the ITC has only 45 days from the date of the filing of the 
petition within which to make a preliminary injury determination. 
118. Id. art. 4(9), 31 U.S.T. at 526. 
119. See PATERSON, supra note 48, at 127. 
120. SIMA, supra note 14, § 76(5). 
121. 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (\982 & Supp. II 1984). 
122. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a). 
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and by the Commission upon a showing of "changed circumstances."123 
Normally, the ITA will not consider ari initial request for review until 
after a CVD order has been in place for a minimum of two years.1U 
Although both CVD laws provide for judicial review of administrative 
findings and orders,1211 Chapter 19 of the FT A has replaced judicial re-
view with binational panel review of all administrative determinations in-
volving imports from either country. 
Settlement of CVD Investigations 
The procedures set out in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 and the 
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 for settling a CVD case are far more com-
plex and prolix, and the discretion of the ITA is much more circum-
scribed, than is the case with the undertakings provisions of SIMA. Under 
the U.S. CVD law an investigation may be settled by termination or sus-
pension of the investigation.126 Under SIMA there is no provision for ter-
minating an investigation, only for suspending one.127 Termination under 
U.S. law may occur in two ways. First, if the petitioner withdraws its 
petition, the ITA or the Commission may terminate the investigation after 
notice to all parties to the investigation.128 Second, the ITA may terminate 
a CVD investigation by accepting a quantitative restriction agreement 
from the government of the country in which the subsidy practice is al-
leged to occur.129 Before the ITA may conclude such an agreement, how-
ever, it must take into account the following public interest factors: 
(i) whether, based upon the relative impact on consumer prices 
and the availability of supplies of the merchandise, the agreement 
would have a greater adverse impact on United States consumers 
123. 19 U.S.C. § J675(b). 
124. See generally Bello & Holmer, Review and Revocation of Antidumping and Counter-
vailing Duty Orders, 19 INT'L LAW. 1319 (1985) (discussing the effects of changes in Department of 
Commerce regulations upon the annual and "changed circumstances" reviews of antidumping and 
CVD orders). 
125. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1982 & Supp. II 1984); Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. to (2d 
Supp.), §§ 28, 31. 
126. 19 U.S.C. § 1671c (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See Holmer and Bello, Suspension and Settle-
ment Agreements in Unfair Trade Cases, 18 INT'L LAW. 683 (t 984) [hereinafter Holmer & Bello, 
Suspension Agreements[ (discussing the Department of Commerce's experience with and positions 
formulat~d .regarding suspension and settlement agreements). 
127. SIMA, supra note 14, § 50. 
128. 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(a). The Commission may not terminate an investigation under this dr-
cumstance until after the ITA has made its preliminary determination. 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(a)(3). 
129. 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(a)(2). 
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than the imposition of countervailing duties; 
(ii) the relative impact on the international economic interests of 
the United States; and 
(iii) the relative impact on the competitiveness of the domestic in-
dustry producing the like merchandise, including any such impact 
on employment and investment in that industry.13o 
In addition, before making its public interest evaluation, the ITA must, 
to the extent practicable, consult with potentially affected consuming in-
dustries, and potentially affected producers and workers in the domestic 
industry producing the like product, including producers and workers not 
a party to the investigation.13l In short, while termination of an investiga-
tion can occur before the ITA or the Commission makes its preliminary 
determination, the ways of doing so are narrowly circumscribed. 
By contrast, suspension of a CVD investigation can be accomplished 
through one of four types of agreements but only after the ITA has issued 
an affirmative preliminary determination.132 The Deputy Minister, by 
comparison, can agree to three types of undertakings, but is prohibited 
from suspending a CVD investigation if he has already made a prelimi-
nary determination of subsidizing.133 Contrary to the practice applicable 
when an investigation is terminated, the ITA and the Commission must 
continue their investigations despite suspension if either the government of 
the country alleged to have subsidized or the interested U.S. parties so 
req uest. 134 The same is true in Canada. 1311 
The ITA must satisfy itself that suspension of an investigation is in the 
public interest and that effective monitoring of a suspension agreement is 
practicable before accepting any suspension agreement. 13S Similarly, the 
Deputy Minister may not accept an undertaking unless he is satisfied that 
the price at which the goods are sold to importers in Canada will not 
130. 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(a)(2)(B). 
131. 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(a)(2)(C). 
132. 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(b)-(f). 
133. SIMA, supra note 14, § 49(2)(b). Section 49(2)(b) states that "[t]he Deputy Minister shall 
not accept an undertaking . . . where he has made a preliminary determination of . . . subsidizing 
with respect to the goods .... " Id. 
134. 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(g). Cf Subsidies Code, supra note 12, art. 4(5)(a)-(b), 31 U.S.T. at 
524, which states that even if an undertaking is accepted, "the investigation of injury shall neverthe-
less be completed if the exporting signatory so desires . . . ." Id. 
135. SIMA, supra note 14, § 51. This provision for the mandatory resumption of an investiga-
tion upon request following suspension is derived from Article 4(5)(b) of the Subsidies Code, supra 
note 12, 31 U.S.T. 524. 
136. 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(d)(t). 
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increase by more than the estimated amount of the subsidy.ls7 This re-
quirement, which appears designed to protect against overpriced imported 
goods being sold in Canada, parallels the public interest factor set out in 
section 1671c(a)(2)(B)(i) which instructs the ITA to consider "whether, 
based upon the relative impact on consumer prices and the availability of 
supplies of the merchandise, the agreement would have a greater adverse 
impact on United States consumers than the imposition of countervailing 
duties."ls8 In addition, the Deputy Minister, like his American counter-
part, may not accept an undertaking "where he is of the opinion that it 
would not be practicable to administer the undertaking."ls9 
Other than providing notice in the Canada Gazette that an undertaking 
has been accepted and that the CVD investigation has been suspended 
with his reasons therefor,140 the Deputy Minister has no other require-
ments to meet before suspending a CVD investigation. The ITA, on the 
other hand, while having the same statutory notice obligation,141 must 
take three additional steps before suspending a CVD investigation: 
(1) notify the petitioner of, and consult with the petitioner con-
cerning, its intention to suspend the investigation, and notify other 
parties to the investigation and the Commission not less than 30 
days before the date on which it suspends the investigation, 
(2) provide a copy of the proposed agreement to the petitioner at 
the time of the notification, together with an explanation of how 
the agreement will be carried out and enforced (including any ac-
tion required of foreign governments), and of how the agreement 
will meet the requirements ... [for concluding suspension agree-
ments], and 
(3) permit all interested parties to the investigation to submit com-
ments and information for the record before the date on which 
notice of suspension of the investigation is published . . . .142 
The Senate Finance Committee added that "the requirement that the pe-
titioners be consulted will not be met by pro forma communications. Com-
plete disclosure and discussion is required."143 In other words, presenting 
137. SIMA § 49(2)(a). 
138. 19 V.S.C. § 1671 c(a)(2)(8)(i). 
139. SIMA § 49(2)(c). 
140. SIMA § 50. 
141. 19 V.S.C. § 1671c(f)(1). 
142. 19 V.S.C. § 1671c(e)(1)-(3). 
143. S. Rt:p. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 54, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
Nt:ws 381, [hereinafter S. REP. No. 249J. 
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the petitioner with a fait accompli is viewed neither sympathetically nor 
in keeping with the letter or spirit of this notification and consultation 
provlSlon. 
The four types of suspension agreements permitted under the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979 are (1) an agreement by the government of the 
country providing the subsidy or by the exporters who account for sub-
stantially all the imports of the subject merchandise to eliminate or com-
pletely offset the subsidy,144 (2) an agreement to eliminate the injurious 
effect of the subsidy/411 (3) a quantitative restriction agreement,146 and (4) 
an agreement to cease exports of the subsidized goods to the United 
States.147 The Deputy Minister's three options are an undertaking with 
the exporter to eliminate the subsidy, an undertaking with the government 
of the country to eliminate the subsidy, or an undertaking to eliminate the 
injury caused by the subsidizing.u8 Although the Deputy Minister will 
not formally have reached a preliminary determination of subsidization, 
undertakings to eliminate a subsidy nonetheless assume the existence of an 
unlawful subsidy. 
The ITA may only entertain an agreement to eliminate injurious effect 
in cases deemed to be comprised of "extraordinary circumstances,"149 de-
fined as circumstances in which (1) suspension of an investigation will be 
more beneficial to the domestic industry than continuation of the investi-
gation, and (2) the investigation is complex (e.g., the case involves a large 
number of exporters or novel legal issues).lIIo An agreement to eliminate 
injurious effect must also meet two additional requirements .. The first is 
that the agreement must prevent the suppression or undercutting of prices 
of domestic products by the imports, and the second is that at least eighty-
five percent of the net subsidy will be offset by the agreement.1II1 Quanti-
tative restriction suspension agreements are subject to the same public in-
144. 19 u.s.c. § 1671c(b). 
145. 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(c). 
146. 19 u.s.c. § 1671c(c)(3) (quantitative restriction agreements may only be made with foreign 
governments and not with exporters). 
147. 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(b)-(c). See Holmer & Bello, Suspension Agreements, supra note 126, at 
684. 
148. SIMA, supra note 14, § 49(I)(a)-(b). 
149. 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(c) (1982). 
150. 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(c)(4). "Complex" as used in the statute means "(i) there are a large 
number of alleged subsidy practices and the practices are complicated, (ii) the issues raised are novel, 
or (iii) the number of exporters involved is large." 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(c)(4)(B). Cf 19 U.S.C. § 
1671b(c), which identifies the same factors which will make a CVD proceeding "extraordinarily 
complicated. " 
151. 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(c)(2)(A)-(B) (these requirements apply except in the case of an agree-
ment with a foreign government to restrict the volume of subsidized imports). 
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terest factors and prior consultation requirements that apply to quantita-
tive restriction termination agreements. lOll 
Of these four types of suspension agreements, the first and third have 
been used most often/os but not extensively,u4 probably due to congres-
sional direction that suspension agreements be the exception rather than 
the rule: 
The suspension provIsIOn is intended to permit rapid and prag-
matic resolutions of countervailing duty cases. However, suspen-
sion is an unusual action which should not become the normal 
means of disposing of cases. The committee intends that investiga-
tions be suspended only when that action serves the interests of 
the public and the domestic industry affected. For this reason, the 
authority to suspend investigations is narrowly circumscribed.loo 
The few suspension agreements concluded by the ITA over the years is 
fair evidence that the ITA takes this congressional admonition seriously. 
Finally, both the TAA and SIMA provide for revocation of a suspen-
sion agreement or undertaking and resumption of the CVD investigation 
if the ITA or Deputy Minister determines that the agreement or under-
taking has been violated or that the circumstances for entering into an 
agreement or undertaking in the first place no longer exist.uG In the 
United States, a compliance review of suspension agreements is to be un-
dertaken at least once a year beginning with the anniversary date of pub-
lication of notice of suspension.u7 A review of the changed circumstances 
conducted by the Commission may also be requested at any time for any 
suspension agreement other than a quantitative restriction agreement. 108 
In Canada, the Deputy Minister must conduct a compliance review 
within three years from the date on which he accepted the undertaking, 
and may renew it for up to three years. 109 
152. 19 U.S.C. § 167Ic(d). See supra notes 120-142 and accompanying text where the public 
interest factors and prior consultation requirements are described. 
153. See Holmer & Bello, Suspension Agreements, supra note 147, at 694-95; Easton, Counter-
vailing Duty Investigations, in LAW & PRACTICE OF UNITED STATES REGULATiON OF INTERNA-
TIONAl. TRADE 23-24 (C. Johnston, Jr., ed. 1987). 
154. See generally Holmer & Bello, Suspension Agreements, supra note 147. Through June, 
1987, fewer than 30 CVD investigations have been suspended by agreement. Easton, Countervailing 
Duty Investigations, supra note 153, at 23. 
155. S. Rt:p. No. 249, supra note 143 at 54, 1979 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 381. 
156. 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(i)(1); SIMA, supra note 14, § 52. 
157. 19 U.S.C. § I 675(a)(1)(C). 
158. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b). 
159. SIMA, supra note 14, § 53(1). 
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"Industry" and "Like Product" Determinations 
The ITC must determine what the affected US. industry is and what 
domestic products are like the imports that are the subject of the investiga-
tion. "Like product" means "a product which is like, or in the absence of 
like, most similar in characteristics and uses with, the article subject to an 
investigation. "160 This definition, given its apparent tautological nature, 
may not be entirely consistent with the Subsidies Code definition of like 
product: 
[A] product which is identical, i.e., alike in all respects to the 
product under consideration or in the absence of such a product, 
another product which although not alike in all respects, has char-
acteristics closely resembling those of the product under 
consideration.11I1 
The Code's like product prescription has a one-dimensional focus of prod-
uct characteristics, not uses or substitutes as does the Trade Agreements 
Act. Under the US. CVD law, the imports and the domestic product in 
effect must be in competition with one another in order for the domestic 
product to be found to be "like" the import. The Commission's "like 
product" determination in large measure shapes its "industry" finding. 
The Trade Agreements Act defines "industry" as: 
[T]he domestic producers as a whole of a like product or 
those producers whose collective output of the like product consti-
tutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of that 
product. 1112 
If exporters or importers of the merchandise that is the subject of the 
CVD investigation are related to a domestic producer, that producer may 
be excluded from the "industry" in the course of the Commission's injury 
investigation. IllS In addition, in appropriate circumstances, the Commis-
sion is empowered to find the existence of a separate, regional industry if 
the producers within a geographical market sell all or most of their pro-
duction in that market and the demand in that market is not met to any 
substantial degree by US. producers outside of that market. 11l4 In that 
160. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(10}. • 
161. Subsidies Code, supra note 12, art. 6, 31 U.S.T. at 527. 
162. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4}(A}. 
163. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4}(8}. 
164. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4}(C}. 
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event, the ITC may find injury to exist in the regional market if the sub-
sidized imports are concentrated in that market and if most of the regional 
producers of the like product are being materially injured by reason of 
those imports. "1611 
In a protectionist refinement the injury determination may be focused 
on specific product lines "if available data permit the separate identifica-
tion of production in terms of such criteria as the production process or 
the producer's profits."166 In the absence of such data, the focus then be-
comes "the production of the narrowest group or range of products, which 
includes a like product, for which the necessary information can be pro-
vided."167 How a domestic producer prepares its CVD petition, particu-
larly the "like product" portion, can significantly influence the outcome of 
an investigation. By including product lines that are faring poorly and 
excluding healthy product groups, a petitioner might well improve its 
chances for obtaining relief. Although the upshot of this narrowing pro-
cess may be to make it easi~r for a domestic producer to obtain relief 
under the CVD law, 168 the relief obtained likewise will be limited by this 
narrowing, with countervailing duties being assessed in a discriminating 
manner on a select line of products rather than across the board in a more 
random fashion. 
REASONABLE INDICATION OF MATERIAL INJURY, MATERIAL INJURY, 
AND CAUSATION 
The material injury and retardation analyses of the U.S. International 
Trade Commission169 closely track those of the Canadian Import Tribu-
nal. The major difference between the two agencies in their processing of 
165. Id. 
166. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(0). 
167. Id. 
168. The Senate Report on the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 stated in this connection: 
The requirement that a product be like the imported article should not be interperted in 
such a narrow fashion as to permit minor differences in physical characteristics or uses to 
lead to the conclusion that the product and article are not "like" each other, nor should the 
definition of "like product" be interpreted in such a fashion as to prevent consideration of 
an industry adversely affected by the imports under consideration. 
S. Rt:p. No. 249, supra note 143 at 90, 1979 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS. 381,476. 
169. See Bello & Holmer, Recent Developments Regarding Antidumping and Countervailing 
Duty Injury Determinations, 20 lNT'L LAW. 689, 694 (1986) (reviewing three recent developments in 
the lTC's injury determinations: 1) the "reasonable indication" standard in preliminary injury deter-
minations, 2) margins analysis in final injury determinations, and 3) application of the cumulation 
provision of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984). 
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CVD petltlOns is the Commission's two-phase injury determination. 
Within forty-five days after the filing of a CVD petition the ITC must 
make a preliminary determination of whether there is a "reasonable indi-
cation" that a U.S. industry is being materially injured or is threatened 
with such injury, or the establishment of a U.S. industry is materially 
retarded, by reason of the imports that are the subject of the CVD investi-
gation.170 The "reasonable indication" threshold is an easy one for peti-
tioners to cross. The House Report on the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 
notes: 
It is the intention of the Committee that a "reasonable indication" 
will exist in each case in which the facts reasonably indicate that 
an industry in the United States could possibly be suffering mate-
rial injury, threat thereof, or material retardation. 171 
The Commission considers and weighs all the evidence presented to it 
at the preliminary stage of its investigation, not merely that evidence 
which tends to show the existence of injury.172 
As noted, the Canadian Import Tribunal's injury determination is a 
one-step process, unlike the Commission's two-phase injury inquiries. The 
reasonable-indication-of-injury determination conducted by the Commis-
sion is not unlike the Deputy Minister's threshold injury inquiry made 
upon receipt and initial review of a CVD complaint.173 
The standard used by the Commission at the preliminary injury phase 
of its investigation is an extremely generous one from the standpoint of the 
domestic industry. The Federal Circuit, in American Lamb Co. v. United 
States,t" directed the Commission to reach a negative preliminary injury 
determination only if (1) the record as a whole contains clear and convinc-
ing evidence that there is no material injury or threat of such injury, and 
(2) no likelihood exists that contrary evidence will arise in a final investi-
gation. l7II Although this charge from the Federal Circuit seemed straight-
forward enough, the Commission's 1988 preliminary injury determination 
170. 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(a) (1982). 
171. H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1979). 
172. See American Lamb Co. v. United States, 785 F.2d 994,1003-04 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (uphold-
ing the Commission's practice of weighing all conflicting evidence at the preliminary phase of its 
CVD injury investigation). 
173. Because of the conclusory nature of the Deputy Minister's statement of reasons, it is diffi-
cult to draw a conclusion regarding the evidentiary standard he uses in assessing whether there is a 
reasonable indication of injury. 
174. 785 F.2d 994 (Fed Cir. 1986). 
175. /d. at 1001. 
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in New Steel Rails from Canada 176 shows that some confusion exists 
among the Commissioners on this score. In that determination, the Com-
mission unanimously determined that there was a reasonable indication 
that the domestic steel rail industry was being materially injured by new 
steel rail imports from Canada. 177 In his additional views, Commissioner 
Alfred Eckes asked: 
Is the relevant standard for a preliminary negative determination 
whether there is "clear and convincing evidence that there is no 
material injury," a position a Commission majority adopted in the 
recent Shock Absorbers investigation? Or, is the appropriate stan-
dard "clear and convincing evidence or no reasonable indication" 
of material injury, an interpretation that I offered in the same 
preliminary investigation ?178 
Commissioner Eckes added that he was not attempting to resurrect the 
"mere possibility" standard adopted by the Court of International Trade 
but ultimately rejected by the Federal Circuit. 179 On this same point, 
Vice-Chairman Ronald Cass suggested that the appropriate quantum of 
proof needed to meet the "reasonable indication" standard would be "at 
least a colorable basis" for an affirmative final determination. 180 This is-
sue is more than academic in those cases where the evidence of material 
injury is threadbare.18l 
176. New Steel Rails from Canada, USITC Pub. 2135, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-297, 731-TA-422 
(Nov. 1988) (prelim. determinations). The Department of External Affairs sent a formal diplomatic 
note to the Commerce Department objecting to this investigation. See ITC Says Steel Rails From 
Canada May Be Injuring U.S. Industry, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1505 (1988). 
177. New Steel Rails from Canada, USITC Pub. 2135 at 3. 
178. Id. at 15 (footnotes omitted). 
179. Id. at 18. 
180. Id. at 26. 
18t. For example, in a recent Commission preliminary injury determination; Certain Steel 
Wheels from Brazil, USITC Pub. 2124, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-296, 731-TA-420 (Sept. 1988) (prelim. 
determinations), Acting Chairman Brunsdale and Commissioner Liebeler first found that aluminum 
and steel wheels produced in the United States were the like product of the imports and that a mixed 
record existed insofar as the performance of the domestic aluminum and steel wheel producers was 
concerned.ld. at 8-12. In their separate opinion, Commissioners I;.ckes and Lodwick found that alu-
minum wheels were a different product from steel wheels, based on their different physical appear-
ance, customer perceptions, and aluminum wheels' low interchangeability with steel wheels given 
their much higher price. Id. at 22-25. (Commissioners Rohr and Cass did not participate in the 
determination.) Although economic data was sparse, domestic sales of aluminum wheels were increas-
ing. On the other hand, domestic steel wheel producers were experiencing declining sales, but invento-
ries were not growing either. Id. at 10-12,26-28. The domestic industry had apparently presented the 
Commission with a somewhat stacked deck, presenting information that tended to show industry in-
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If the lTC's preliminary determination is negative, the entire investiga-
tion is entirely terminated;182 if affirmative, the Commission proceeds to 
the final injury determination phase of the investigation. 
Material Injury 
The TAA's definition of "material injury" is no more helpful than 
SIMA's: "harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimpor-
tant."lss The factors considered by the Import Tribunal under its Rule 36 
when making an injury determination are similar to, but not as compre-
hensive as, the statutory factors which the Commission must consider 
when making material injury and threat of materia! injury assessments. 
The Import Tribunal's discretion in this connection is potentially far 
greater than that of the Commission, considering that Congress in the 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 set forth detailed guide-
lines which the ITC must consider when addressing the injury ques-
tion. 184 Nevertheless, Congress has still reposed in the Commission some 
jury in that part of the industry that was weakest, and little, if any, from that part of the industry 
where demand was rising. [d. Nevertheless, the Commission determined that there was a reasonable 
indication that the domestic industry was materially injured. [d. at I, 3, 28-32. With regard to the 
causation factor, the Commission found that Brazilian steel wheel imports had increased during the 
period of investigation, but that there was a dearth of evidence as to whether imports had had any 
price effects on the domestic like product. ld. at 14-15. Grasping the thin reed of increasing Brazilian 
imports, the Commission concluded that the domestic industry was being materially injured by reason 
of the Brazilian imports. [d. In their concluding remarks, Commissioner Liebeler and Acting Chair-
man Brunsdale seemed little troubled by the dearth of supporting evidence and, when there was 
evidence, how conflicting it was, but nevertheless reached an affirmative determination: 
Given our determination that the like product in this investigation is all wheels, we find 
the record to be incomplete-indeed, unusually so as measured by other preliminary inves-
tigations. The evidence is both sparse and conflicting. The standard for reaching a determi-
nation in preliminary investigations clearly favors an affirmative determination under such 
conditions. Therefore, we determine that there is a reasonable indication that an industry 
in the United States is materially injured or threatened with material injury by reason of 
imports of steel wheels that are allegedly subsidized and allegedly sold at less than fair 
value. 
[d. at 18. 
In their separate opinion Commissioners Eckes and Lodwick likewise acknowledged the incomplete 
record produced by the domestic industry, but nevertheless concluded that price suppression and price 
depression were likely to occur if the current volume of imports was to continue or if imports was to 
increase substantially. [d. at 31. 
182. 19 U.S.C. § 167Ib(a). 
183. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (1982). 
184. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C), as amended by Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1328(2), 1988 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS, 102 Stat. 1107, 1205-06. 
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flexibility by instructing the ITC to consider the specific statutory factors, 
"among other factors,"18& and reminding the public that "[tJhe presence or 
absence of any factor which the Commission is required to evaluate ... 
shall not necessarily give decisive guidance with respect to the determina-
tion by the Commission of material injury."188 Had the Commission been 
left exclusively to its own devices, however, it is not unlikely that it would 
have developed many of the same statutory criteria set out in the CVD 
statute. 
The volume and impact criteria the Commission must consider in both 
the preliminary and final injury determination phases of its investigation 
mirror the Import Tribunal's Rule 36 criteria mentioned above. In mak-
ing its determination, the Commission shall consider: 
(I) the volume of imports of the merchandise which is the subject 
of the investigation, 
(II) the effect of imports of that merchandise on prices in the 
United Stated for like products, and 
(III) the impact of imports of such merchandise on domestic pro-
ducers of like products, but only in the context of production oper-
ations within the United States; 
(ii) and [the Commission] may consider such other economic fac-
tors as are relevant to the determination regarding whether there 
is material injury by reason of imports.18? 
Elaborating on the lTC's task under this subparagraph, Congress has 
further provided: 
(i) Volume-In evaluating the volume of imports of merchandise, 
the Commission shall consider whether the volume of imports of 
the merchandise, or any increase in that volume, either in absolute 
terms or relative to production or consumption in the United 
States, is significant. 
(ii) Price-In evaluating the effect of imports of such merchandise 
on prices, the Commission shall consider whether-
(I) there has been significant price underselling by the imported 
For an overview of the 1988 Trade Act, see The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988: 
An Analysis of Its Impact and Consequences. 1988 A.B.A. SEC. INT'L L. & PRAC. (Sept. 30, 1988) 
(publication from A.B.A. symposia on the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988). 
185. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B). 
186. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(E)(ii). 
187. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B), as amended by Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1328(1), 1988 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS, 102 Stat. 1107, 1205. 
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merchandise as compared with the price of like products of the 
United States, and 
(II) the effect of imports of such merchandise otherwise depresses 
prices to a significant deg~e or prevents price increases, which 
otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree. 
(iii) Impact on Affected Domestic Industry-In examining the 
impact required to be considered under subparagraph (B)(iii), the 
Commission shall evaluate all relevant economic factors which 
have a bearing on the state of the industry of the United States, 
including but not limited to-
(I) actual and potential decline in output, sales, market share, 
nrnfit" nrn,j .. ~.: •• :.-. --,-_ .• - l'nvestments, and' utl-ll'zatl'on of r ..................... , t'.Vu."" .... U.VJLY, JClUJU Ull 
capacity, 
. (II) factors affecting domestic prices, 
(III) actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, invento-
ries, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital, and in-
vestment, and 
(IV) actual and potential negative effects on the existing develop-
ment and production efforts of the domestic industry, including 
efforts to develop a derivative or more advanced version of the like 
product. 
The Commission shall evaluate all relevant economic factors 
described in this clause within the context of the business cycle 
and conditions of competition that are distinctive to the affected 
industry.188 
The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 added a provlSlon requmng the 
Commission to cumulate the volume and effect factors in cases involving 
imports from two or more countries of like products subject to a CVD 
investigation.18s The reason for including this requirement in the CVD 
law was to take into account the situation where subsidized imports were 
entering the United States from a number of countries, but which when 
evaluated on a country-by-country basis represented only a fraction of the 
188. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C), as amended by Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1328(2), 1988 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 102 Stat. 1107, 1205-06. 
A special injury rule for agricultural imports is also found in both pieces of legislation. SIMA adds 
that material injury means "in respect only of the subsidizing of an agricultural product, an increase 
in the financial burden on a federal or provincial government agricultural support program in Ca-
nada." SIMA § 2(\). The U.S. CVD law provides that "[iJn the case of agricultural products, the 
Commission shall consider any increased burden on government income or price support programs." 
19 U.S.C. § I 677(7)(D)(ii). . 
189. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iv) (Supp. IV 1986). 
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total volume of imports, and standing alone could not be the cause of ma-
terial injury.19o Not only is the Commission required to cumulate from 
two or more countries in a CVD investigation, it must also cross-cumulate 
imports of like products which are the subject of concurrent antidumping 
and CVD investigations.191 Moreover, the Commission has cumulated im-
ports from countries which qualify for an injury test with imports from 
countries which are not subject to that test. 192 Here, the U.S. legislation 
and the Canadian CVD law part paths. 
The two laws also deviate in regard to the factors to be considered 
when assessing the threat of material injury. Any ITC injury determina-
tion based on threat of material injury must be based on evidence that the 
threat "is real and that actual injury is imminent; [s]uch a determination 
may not be made on the basis of mere conjecture or supposition.»l93 In 
other words, material injury, if it has not already occurred, must be likely 
to occur as a result of the imports under investigation. The analogous 
provision under SIMA, whether imports are "likely to cause material in-
jury,"194 carries with it no statutory guidance for the Import Tribunal. 
The same is true, of course, in regard to material injury in general. In 
addition, the Import Tribunal Rules do not provide separate factors which 
the Tribunal will consider when addressing the issue of whether certain 
imports are "likely to cause material injury." Instead, Tribunal Rule 36 
lumps together all material injury inquiries without distinction, factors 
which are effectively co-extensive with those contained in 19 U.S.C. 
§§1677(7)(B)-(C). The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 added a non-ex-
haustive list of eight economic factors the Commission must consider when 
determining whether imports pose a threat of material injury: 
(I) if a subsidy is involved, such information as may be 
presented to it by the administering authority as to the nature of 
the subsidy (particularly as to whether the subsidy is an export 
subsidy inconsistent with the Agreement), 
(II) any increase in production capacity or existing unused ca-
pacity in the exporting country likely to result in a significant in-
crease in imports of the merchandise to the United States, 
190. H.R. REP. No. 725, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1984). 
191. Bingham & Taylor Diy. of Va. Indus., Inc. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 793, 795 (Ct. 
Int'l Trade 1986), affd, 815 F.2d 1482,1486 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
192. See Certain Fresh Cut Flowers from Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Israel, Kenya, Mexico, The Netherlands, and Peru, USITC Pub. 1877, Iny. Nos. 303-TA-17, 18; 
701-TA-275 to -78; 731-TA-327 to -34 (July 1986) (prelim. determinations) at 12. 
193. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(ii) (Supp. IV 1986). 
194. SIMA, supra note 14, § 42(1 )(a)(i). 
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(III) any rapid increase in United States market penetration 
and the likelihood that the penetration will increase to an injuri-
ous level, 
(IV) the probability that imports of the merchandise will enter 
the United States at prices that will have a depressing or sup-
pressing effect on domestic prices of the merchandise, 
(V) any substantial increase in inventories of the merchandise 
in the United States, 
(VI) the presence of underutilized capacity for producing the 
merchandise in the exporting country, 
(VII) any other demonstrable adverse trends that indicate the 
probbility that the impurtation (or sale for importation) of the 
merchandise (whether or not it is actually being imported at the 
time) will be the cause of actual injury, 
(VIII) the potential for product-shifting if production facilities 
owned or controlled by the foreign manufacturers, which can be 
used to produce products subject to investigation(s) ... , are also 
used to produce the merchandise under investigation.19& 
Despite these two exceptions (the cumulation provision and the specific 
statutory criteria for assessing threat of material injury), the injury stan-
dards of the Canadian and U.S. CVD laws are very similar. Again, this 
symmetry is not surprising after comparing those two laws with the 
source document which Congress and Parliament tapped-the Subsidies 
Code. Article 6 of the Code, entitled "Determination of injury," identifies 
those factors that signatories are to consider when making that determina-
tion, factors virtually all of which have been incorporated into SIMA and 
the U.S. CVD law.198 
195. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F), as amended by Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1326(b). 
196. The pertinent Article 6 provisions state: 
1. A determination of injury for purposes of Article VI of the General Agreement shall 
involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of subsidized imports and their 
effect on prices in the domestic market for like products and (b) the consequent impact of 
these imports on domestic producers of such products. 
2. With regard to volume of subsidized imports the investigating authorities shall consider 
whether there has been a significant increase in subsidized imports, either in absolute terms 
or relative to production or consumption in the importing signatory. With regard to the 
effect of the subsidized imports on prices, the investigating authorities shall consider 
whether there has been a significant price undercutting by the subsidized imports as com-
pared with the price of a like product of the importing signatory, or whether the effect of 
such imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree or prevent price in-
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Causation 
What nexus must exist between the subsidized goods and material in-
jury or threat thereof in order to trigger imposition of a countervailing 
duty?197 The House Statement of Administrative Action on Counter-
vailing and Antidumping Duties explained that the words, "by reason of," 
contained in 19 U.S.C. § 1671: 
[E]xpress a causation link, but do not involve a weighing of injury 
by reason of subsidized imports . . . against the effects of other 
factors which may, at the same time, also be injuring the industry. 
The injury caused by subsidization ... need not be the "princi-
pal" or "major" or "substantial" cause of overall injury to an in-
dustry. Any such requirement has the undesirable result of mak-
ing relief more difficult to obtain for those industries facing 
difficulties from a variety of sources, although these may be pre-
cisely those industries that are most vulnerable to subsidized im-
port competition ... 198 
Consistent with this congressional direction, the Commission refrains 
from weighing the various economic factors that might be responsible for 
the injury, and at the same time examines factors other than those set out 
in the CVD statute, such as contraction in demand, trade restrictive prac-
tices of and competition between the foreign and domestic producers, and 
the export performance of the domestic industry, as possible explanations 
for the injury being experienced by the domestic industry.199 
creases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree. No one or several of 
these factors can necessarily give decisive guidance. 
3. The examination of the impact on the domestic industry concerned shall include an 
evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the 
industry such as actual and potential decline in output, sales, market share, profits, produc-
tivity, return on investments, or utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; 
actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, 
ability to raise capital or investment and, in the case of agriculture, whether there has been 
an increased burden on Government support programmes. This list is not exhaustive, nor 
can one or several of these factors necessarily give decisive guidance. 
Subsidies Code, supra note 12, art. 6, 31 U.S.T. at 527 (footnotes omitted). 
197. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2). 
198. H.R. Doc. No. 153, Part II, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 388,434, reprinted in 1979 U.S. Code 
Congo & Ad. News 665, 700. Accord S. REP. No. 249, supra note 143 at 57,1979 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 381, 443. 
199. 19 C.F.R. § 207.27 (1986). 
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THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CVD STATUTES 
Although the Canadian and U.S. CVD statutes do vary, they closely 
parallel one another in most material respects. The next part of this arti-
cle has a threefold focus. First, it considers the Canadian administrative 
practice under its CVD law as reflected in two final CVD determinations, 
Grain Corn from the United States (involving domestic subsidies),200 and 
Dry Pasta from the European Economic Community (involving export 
subsidies).201 Second, it looks at the administrative practice of the Com-
merce Department and the ITC under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 
and the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. Finally, it examines how the ad-
ministrative practice of th~ two Canadi:m agencics resembles or differs 
from U.S. practice. 
Administrative Practice in Canada 
Export Subsidy Determinations By the Deputy Minister-Dry 
Pasta from the European Community 
On May 12, 1986, the Canadian Pasta Manufacturers' Association 
filed a complaint with the Deputy Minister alleging injurious subsidiza-
tion of dry pasta originating in or exported from the European Commu-
nity (EC).202 The Association consists of five members who are major Ca-
nadian pasta producers. Four of the five were actively involved in the 
case, representing ninety-five percent of Canadian production.203 After 
concluding on June 2, 1986, that the complaint was properly documented 
(within the twenty-one day period set forth in SIMA), and after having 
satisfied himself that there was evidence of subsidizing and of reasonable 
indication of material injury, the Deputy Minister initiated an investiga-
tion on July 2, 1986 (within the thirty day initiation period set out in 
200. Final Determination of Subsidizing Respecting Grain Corn from the United States, Deputy 
Minister of National Revenue for Customs and Excise, Feb. 2, 1987; Subsidized Grain Corn 
Originating In or Exported From the United States of America, Canadian Import Tribunal, Inq. No. 
CIT -7 -86 (Mar. 6, 1987) (final). 
201. Final Determination of Subsidizing Respecting Dry Pasta from the European Economic 
Community, Deputy Minister of National Revenue for Customs and Excise, Dec. 19, 1986; Dry 
Pasta Originating In or Exported From the European Economic Community, Canadian Import Tri-
bunal, Inquiry No. CIT-S-86 (Dec. 19, 1986). 
202. Final Determination of Subsidizing Respecting Dry Pasta from the European Economic 
Community, Deputy Minister of National Revenue for Customs and Excise 3, Dec. 19, 1986 [herein-
after Dry Pasta Statement of Reasons). 
203. Id. at 3. 
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SIMA).204 The scope of the investigation covered wheat-based, dry pasta 
for sale at the retail level (packages weighing no more than 2.5 kg.), thus 
excluding corn-based pasta, pasta products packaged in other than dry 
form such as canned or frozen pasta, and pasta in bulk. 2011 The Deputy 
Minister reached an affirmative preliminary determination on September 
30, 1986 (within the ninety day period prescribed in SIMA for prelimi-
nary determinations).206 Based on additional information received subse-
quent to his preliminary determfnation, the Deputy Minister concluded 
that neither t~e amount of the subsidy nor the actual or potential volume 
of subsidized goods was negligible and, accordingly, issued a final affirma-
tive determination on December 19, 1986 (also within SIMA's ninety day 
period for reaching final determinations).207 Despite this affirmative de-
termination, approximately one month later, on January 28, 1987, the 
Import Tribunal issued a negative injury finding, thus terminating the 
CVD proceeding.208 
The Deputy Minister investigated two EC export subsidy programs. 
The first involved export refunds on certain cereals exported in the form 
of macaroni, spaghetti, and similar products. The second involved export 
refunds on eggs and egg yolks when exported in the form of pasta prod-
uctS.209 By following EC regulations setting forth certain ratios of wheat 
and eggs used in pasta products for export, an EC pasta producer would 
qualify for the export refund.210 Producers in five EC member countries 
(Italy, the Netherlands, France, Greece, and West Germany) were the 
focus of the investigation. 211 The final countervailing duty calculated by 
the Deputy Minister for producers in these five countries was by weight 
and was set in the national currency of the country export.212 Thus, for 
example, pasta with eggs exported from West Germany was found to 
have been subsidized DM.77 per kg. (approximately CAN$0.50).213 Pasta 
without eggs exported from France was found to have been subsidized 
204. Id. 
205. Id. at 3, 4. 
206. Id. at 1. 
207. Id. at 3, 7. 
208. Dry Pasta Originating In or Exported From the European Economic Community, Cana-
dian Import Tribunal, Inquiry No. CIT-5-86 Uan. 28, 1987) [hereinafter Dry Pasta Finding of 
Injury). 
209. Dry Pasta Statement of Reasons, supra note 202, at 4. 
210. Id. at 4-5. 
211. Notices of Commencement of Inquiry were origionally sent to the governments of Italy, 
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britian, Portugal, the Netherlands and Greece. Id. 
at \-2 .. 
212. Id. at 7. 
213. Id., app. D. 
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FF2.16 per kg. (approximately CAN$0.40).214 
Section 2(5) of SIMA directs the Deputy Director to "take fully into 
account" the provisions of Article of the Subsidies Code concerning export 
subsidies. That Article in general prohibits granting export subsidies on 
products "other than certain primary products,"211i as that term is defined 
in Ad Article XVI, Section B, paragraph 2 of GATT: "any product of 
farm, forest or fishery ... in its natural form or which has undergone 
such processing as is customarily required to prepare it for marketing in 
substantial volume in international trade."216 Pasta does not come within 
this definition of "primary product." In addition, among the prohibited 
programs mentioned in the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies annexed 
tv the SubslJics Code is "[tjhe provision by governments of direct subsi-
dies to a firm or an industry contingent upon export performance."217 In 
view of the fact that the Ee subsidy programs were indeed premised on 
export performance, it would have been surprising if the Deputy Minister 
had not determined that the programs under review in Dry Pasta from 
the EC came within this prohibition. 
The Import Tribunal's Injury Finding In Dry Pasta From the EC 
The Import Tribunal received notice of the Deputy Minister's prelimi-
nary determination in Dry Pasta on September 30, 1986, and issued its 
injury finding on January 28, 1987 (within the 120-day period set forth 
in section 43(1) of SIMA).21s The domestic industry alleged that the sub-
sidized pasta imports had caused, were causing, and were likely to cause 
material injury to the production in Canada of pasta products in the form 
of lost market share (the domestic industry had a ninety percent market 
share),219 price suppression, reduced profitability, increased promotional 
costs, deferred investments, extended plant shutdowns, and reduced em-
ployment.22o The domestic industry pointed to three developments which, 
it contended, were causing and were likely to cause it material injury by 
reason of the EC pasta imports. First, with regard to price suppression, 
the domestic industry alleged that it had only two choices in the face of 
the low-priced import competition: either maintain prices and lose market 
share and volume, or cut prices and suffer financial losses. The domestic 
214. Id. 
215. Subsidies Code, supra note 13, art. 9, 31 U.S.T. at 531. 
216. GATT, supra note 10. 
217. Subsidies Code, supra note 13,31 U.S.T. at 546 annex. 
218. Dry Pasta Injury Finding, supra note 208, at :. 
219. Id. at 3. 
220. Id. at 4. 
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industry's problem was exacerbated, it stated, by the decision of the Cana-
dian Wheat Board to fix the price of wheat at a higher level. 221 The in-
dustry thus found itself in a predicament because the low prices in the 
domestic pasta market made it impossible, the industry maintained, to 
pass on the increased cost of domestic wheat. 222 Second, the low-priced 
EC pasta not only encroached on both the available promotion time and 
shelf space, it also allowed retail grocery chain stores to whipsaw the do-
mestic producers in negotiations by setting a low base price for pasta 
products.223 Third, regarding potential future injury, the domestic indus-
try argued that because price played an important part in chain stores' 
pasta buying decisions, low-priced pasta imports, if allowed to continue, 
would cause it material injury in the future. 224 
In response to these contentions, the importers and exporters of EC 
pasta argued that the domestic industry's difficulties were due to competi-
tion inter sese and not with foreign producers. 2211 Moreover, intra-industry 
price competition was standard for the pasta industry and so fierce that 
upward price movement was unlikely.226 In addition, the exporters and 
importers maintained that there was no showing of significant market 
penetration by imports or of product substitution.227 
Turning to the issue of material injury, the Import Tribunal began by 
noting that the traditional indicators of injury-sales volume, capacity, 
utilization, and employment-had held fairly constant and reflected 
favorable growth within the domestic industry. Looking at the preceding 
five-year period, the Import Tribunal concluded that the domestic pasta 
industry had not lost any market share to imports during that time.228 
The Tribunal therefore directed its attention to price suppression and its 
impact on the financial performance and future investment plans of the 
domestic industry.229 The Tribunal agreed that the domestic industry was 
indeed caught in a cost-price squeeze as a result of the Canadian Wheat 
Board's change in policy which caused the price of Canadian wheat, and 
consequently the price of flour, to diverge dramatically from the world 




224. See id. 
225. See id. 
226. [d. at 4-5. 
227. [d. at 5. 
228. ld. 
229. [d. 
230. See id. 
726 [Vol. 20 
HeinOnline -- 20 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 727 1988-1989
COUNTER V AILING DUTY REGIME 
price, thus giving them a cost advantage vis-a-vis their Canadian competi-
tors. The domestic industry's inability to raise prices to cover the in-
creased cost of flour was the key to any injury it might be suffering, ac-
cording to the Tribunal. 231 The only question was whether this price 
suppression was attributable to EC pasta imports or to other factors. 
The Tribunal began its analysis by bifurcating the domestic market 
into the retail grocery chain market and the large, independent grocery 
outlet market.232 Although the domestic industry faced stiff price competi-
tion in the former market, pasta imported from the EC had not contrib-
uted significantly to that price competition because EC pasta in the main 
was not sold in the retail chain market due to the high barriers to entry in 
that market.:O;;;; Retail chains imposed a major condition of product pro-
motion of putting a single producer's pasta on sale, the costs of which 
were borne by the producer. By careful husbanding of promotion times, 
chain stores could have pasta on sale throughout the entire year and 
purchase most of their pasta requirements at the promotional prices.234 
Attempts by individual domestic producers to lead a price increase \¥ere 
regularly frustrated because the other members of the industry refused to 
follow the lead.231> Thus, intra-industry competition, not foreign competi-
tion, accounted for the price pressure in the retail chain market, in the 
Tribunal's view. 238 Moreover, to the extent that EC pasta was sold at 
retail chains, it was usually higher priced and in competition with other 
EC brands (generally Italian), not domestic brands.237 
Turning to the independent grocery market which is principally located 
in the Toronto and Montreal metropolitan areas, the Tribunal noted that 
although Italian pasta was higher priced than domestic pasta, even when 
sold on special, the demand for the imported pasta was relatively price 
inelastic due to strong consumer demand from Canadians of Italian de-
scent. 238 In essence, while the domestic and imported pasta were both sold 
231. See id. 
232. Id. 
233. See id. at 6. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. at 6-7. In fact, when one domestic producer attempted to lead a price increase and 
maintained its price even after its domestic competitors failed to follow, it lost a substantial share of its 
market to domestic producers, not to Italian imports. /d. at 7. 
236. Id. at 7. 
237. Id. The Tribunal found a paucity of evidence to support one domestic producer's contention 
that it had lost private-label contracts to lower-priced Italian pasta; it found to the contrary that 
private-label contract competition came from other domestic producers and producers in the United 
States. Id. at 7-8. 
238. See id. at 8. 
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in independent retail grocery stores, they did not compete with each other. 
Consequently, the Tribunal concluded, the price suppression that the do-
mestic industry was experiencing at this market level was due to domestic 
producers competing among themselves and not with EC pasta 
producers.239 
In short, having considered the factors of the actual and potential vol-
ume of imports, price suppression, market share, industry growth-all 
identified in its Rules as relevant areas of inquiry in its injury investiga-
tions24°-the Import Tribunal was not persuaded that a causal link ex-
isted between the financial difficulties of the domestic industry and subsi-
dized pasta imports from the EC. The domestic industry's current 
problems instead were attributable to fierce intra-industry price competi-
tion. 241 As for the likelihood of future injury caused by subsidized pasta 
imports, the Tribunal did not think such injury was foreseeable given the 
absence of significant market penetration by those imports over the period 
under investigation. 242 The Tribunal therefore issued a negative injury 
finding, thus terminating the proceeding.243 
Domestic Subsidy Determinations by The Deputy Minister-Grain Corn 
from the United States 
In one of the most controversial CVD proceedings ever initiated in Ca-
nada, and the first ever against imports from the United States, the Cana-
dian Deputy Minister determined on February 2, 1987, that imports of 
grain corn from the United States were being subsidized.244 Following the 
receipt of a properly documented complaint filed by the Ontario Corn 
Producers' Association, the Deputy Minister initiated a CVD investiga-
tion on July 2, 1986.2411 Because of the complexity and novelty of the 
issues presented in the case, the Deputy Minister extended the time for 
issuing a preliminary determination from the normal 90 days to 135 days 
pursuant to section 39(1) of SIMA.z4s The investigation covered a two-
239. Id. 
240. Canadian Import Tribunal Rules, Reg. No. SOR/85-1068, 119 Can. Gaz. (Part II) 4652, 
4662 (Can. Import Trib. 1985). 
241. Dry Pasta Injury Finding, supra note 208, at 8. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. at 9-10. 
244. Final Determination of Subsidizing Respecting Grain Corn In All Forms, Excluding Seed 
Corn, Sweet Corn and Popping Corn, Originating In or Exported From the United States of 
America, Deputy Minister of National Revenue for Customs and Excise, February 2, 1987 [hereinaf-
ter Grain Corn from the United States (Final)]. 
245. Id. at I. 
246. Preliminary Determination of Subsidizing Respecting Grain Corn in All Forms, Excluding 
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and-a-half year period, from January 1, 1984, to July 1, 1986, and fo-
cused on both white and yellow corn, even though white corn cannot be 
grown in Canada. (Because both types of corn are used in the production 
of snack foods, in order to frustrate any attempt by exporters to blunt the 
imposition of provisional duties on white corn by substituting white corn 
for sales of yellow corn, the Deputy Minister included both types within 
his investigation.)247 
A total of sixty-four state and federal programs were investigated.248 
Eight of the federal programs were found to confer a countervailable sub-
sidy, although for two programs the amount of the subsidy was too small 
to merit calculation.u9 No provisional duty was imposed with respect to 
any state program.260 Because of a significant drop in grain corn prices 
experienced by Canadian grain growers during the period of investiga-
tion-a decline linked directly to lower-priced, subsidized U.S. grain 
corn-stabilization payments from the Ontario provincial and federal gov-
ernments went from zero in 1984-85 to CAN$O.348 per bushel in 1985-
86.261 Given the excess production of grain corn in the United States, re-
sulting in significant inventories, the potential for price depression in the 
Canadian grain corn market and resulting material injury was substantial 
in the Deputy Minister's view.262 The Deputy Minister therefore issued a 
preliminary determination on November 7,1986 (well within the 135-day 
statutory deadline), that U.S. grain corn is being subsidized in the amount 
of US$1.048 per bushe1.263 That determination represented a counter-
vailing duty of over sixty-five percent ad valorem, given the then prevail-
ing market price for U.S. grain corn of $1.55 to $1.65 per bushe1.264 
Of special interest in the Deputy Minister's preliminary determination 
is Appendix I, entitled "Criteria Used To Determine Whether A Pro-
gram Confers A Countervailable Subsidy With Respect To Grain 
Seed Corn, Sweet Corn and Popping Corn, Originating In or Exported From the United States of 
America, Deputy Minister of National Revenue for Customs and Excise, November 7, 1986 [herein-
after Grain Corn from the United States (Preliminary)]. Under that extension of time, a preliminary 
determination, if any, would have to have been issued no later than November 14, 1986, pursuant to 
section 35(1) of SIMA (covering termination for insurficiency of evidence or de minimis subsidizing) 
or section 38(1) of SIMA (issuance of preliminary determinations). [d. at l. 
247. [d. at 2. 
248. [d. at 3. 
249. [d. 
250. [d. 
251. [d. at 2-3. 
252. See id. at 7. 
253. [d. at 3. 
254. ld. at 7. 
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Corn."2CiCi In that Appendix the Deputy Minister for the first time broadly 
outlined the factors that would, if satisfied, trigger the imposition of coun-
tervailing duties in the case of domestic subsidies. Appendix I states in 
pertinent part: 
730 
In determining whether a program constituted a countervailable 
subsidy, three criteria were used: whether the program provided a 
financial or other commercial benefit; whether the program en-
tailed a cost to the government providing the program; and 
whether the program was targeted. 
In subsection 2(1) of the Act [SIMA) a subsidy is defined as 
any financial or other commercial benefit that has accrued or will 
accrue, directly or indirectly, to persons engaged in the produc-
tion, manufacture, growth, processing, purchase, distribution, 
transportation, sale, export or import of grain corn. To be a 
countervailable subsidy, a program does not have to provide a 
benefit directly in respect of the subject goods. The program need 
only provide a benefit to the person engaged in one of the above 
activities related to the subject goods. 
The Department interprets subsection 2(1) of the Act as mean-
ing that a subsidy is a program which entails a cost to the spon-
soring government. If there is no cost to the government, there 
can be no subsidy. 
In determining if a program confers a countervailable subsidy 
the Department has also taken into account principles which have 
been generally accepted internationally concerning generally avail-
able versus targeted government programs. 
A program which is generally available is not considered as be-
ing a countervailable subsidy while a program which is targeted is 
considered to be a countervailable subsidy. The criteria for deter-
mining whether a program is generally available include: availa-
bility to all persons in an industrial sector, e.g., agriculture, avail-
ability to similar persons across a range of industrial sectors e.g., 
small business development; availability to more than one indus-
trial sector; and general availability within the jurisdiction of the 
granting authority, e.g., a state or municipality. A program is con-
sidered to be targeted if, in design or effect, it is available only to 
certain enterprises; access to the program is limited; or certain en-
terprises are excluded from access to the program. [emphases 
255. Grain Corn From the United States (Preliminary), supra note 246, app. I. 
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added]2116 
Applying these criteria to the federal programs alleged to confer a 
countervailable subsidy, the Department found eight programs to be 
countervailable because they were either targeted to a geographic region of 
the United States (either the Great Plains states or the seventeen western-
most states) or targeted to specific crops (feed grains); they conferred a 
benefit to grain corn; and they all entailed a cost to the U.S. Govern-
ment. 2117 The more than fifty federal programs which the Department 
concluded did not confer a countervailable subsidy were considered non-
countervailable because they were either generally available to the entire 
agricultural industry (e.g., Farm Labor Housing Loans and Grants), or 
generally available to the public at large (e.g., Small Business Administra-
tion programs),2118 or because no funds had been expended under a partic-
ular program benefitting grain corn exports to Canada (e.g., the Foreign 
Agricultural Market Development and Promotion program).2119 By focus-
ing narrowly on whether the production of grain corn was benefitted di-
rectly or indirectly to the exclusion of other agricultural sectors, the De-
partment was able to exclude the vast majority of agricultural programs 
alleged by the complainant to confer a countervailable subsidy, including 
programs administered by the Departments of Energy and Agriculture 
which encourage the production of synthetic fuels such as ethanol, a grain 
derivative. 260 
Especially noteworthy in the Department's preliminary determination 
was its decision not to include as part of the provisional duty those bene-
fits allegedly accruing to grain producers from several state agricultural 
programs.261 By applying an identical methodology to state programs, the 
Department was able to conclude that most state programs did not confer 
a countervailable subsidy because they were generally available to all per-
sons engaged in agricultural production in the state sponsoring the pro-
gram.262 The rationale for not including the benefits purportedly accruing 
to U.S. grain producers was either that insufficient information had been 
received from the states in question (Minnesota and Ohio) or that no 
questionnaire response had been received at all from six other states.263 
256. Id. 
257. Id. app. II 
258. Id. app. IV at I, II. 
259. Id. app. IV at 12. 
260. Id. app. IV at 11. 
261. Id. app. III. 
262. Id. app.lVat 17-21. 
263. Id. app. III. 
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This represents a marked departure from U.S. administrative practice. 
Under the "best information available" rule applicable in U.S. CVD and 
antidumping administrative proceedings, the ITA uses the best informa-
tion available "whenever a party or any other person refuses or is unable 
to produce information requested in a timely manner and in the form 
required."264 Under U.S. practice, the failure of a respondent to answer in 
whole or part a questionnaire sent by the IT A will invariably result in 
the imposition of estimated countervailing duties based on the information 
provided by the petitioner, that information generally being "the best in-
formation available" (assuming, of course, that the information contained 
in the petition is sufficient to warrant the imposition of estimated counter-
vailing duties on a rational basis). The U.S. rule has the obvious in ter-
rorem effect of prying information from an otherwise uncooperative re-
spondent. The Deputy Minister has the statutory authority under section 
2(1) of SIMA to determine the amount of a subsidy in any manner he 
prescribes whenever "sufficient information has not been furnished or is 
not available"-in other words, to do exactly what the ITA and Commis-
sion have been empowered to do under the "best information available" 
rule. Although it is possible that the Ontario Grain Producers' Association 
petition itself lacked sufficient information to warrant the imposition of 
provisional duties based on programs sponsored by the eight states listed, 
the Department's preliminary determination indicated that it was insuffi-
cient rebuttal information from the state respondents, rather than a failure 
on the part of the petitioner to make a prima facie case, that led the De-
partment to refrain from ordering provisional countervailing duties in 
connection with those state programs. 2611 
Whether or not the Canadian practice improperly shifted the burden of 
persuasion on the petitioner, it is unquestionably less protectionist than 
the U.S. practice on this score. The fact that the Department imposed 
provisional countervailing duties against four federal programs that were 
eventually dropped from its final determination after receiving better in-
formation from the respondent shows that the Department will indeed 
order the assessment of countervailing duties at the preliminary stage of 
its investigation on the basis of the best information available at the time 
it makes its determination, even if the record is then incomplete. That 
being the case, it is curious that the Department did not also order the 
assessment of provisional duties based on the various state programs for 
which no timely response was received from the responsible state govern-
ment authorities. 
264. 19 U.S.C. § 1 677e(b). 
265. Grain Corn from the United States (Preliminary), supra note 246, at 3. 
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Because of the great number of state and federal programs alleged to 
confer a countervailable subsidy in the Grain Corn case, the Department 
invoked the forty-five day time extension for complex cases. On February 
2, 1987, the Department issued its final determination. The amount of the 
subsidy was reduced by US$O.20 per bushel, from US$1.048 to US$O.849 
per bushel.266 No state programs were found to confer a countervailable 
subsidy, while four federal programs were.267 The Department made two 
significant refinements of its criteria used to determine whether a program 
confers a countervailable subsidy. In its first modification contained in 
Appendix I of its final determination, the Department went from a three-
pronged subsidy test to a two-pronged inquiry by deleting all references to 
whether a program entails a cost to the government providing the pro-
gram as one of the three broad criteria it will use in addressing the ques-
tion of countervailability.268 Thus, whether or not a program entails a cost 
to the sponsoring government is irrelevant. The test, rather, is twofold: 
first, does the program confer a financial benefit? If so, is the program 
targeted ?269 Eliminating the cost-to-government criterion thus brings Ca-
nadian practice more in line with the U.S. approach to countervailability. 
The second major refinement concerns regional programs. As is dis-
cussed below, under U.S. practice a regional program is generally. 
countervailable. The Deputy Minister's approach to regional programs 
under the CVD law, influenced in large part by Canadian federal and 
provincial economic development programs, is to except regional programs 
from the reach of the CVD law if the program could only benefit one 
region because of that region's unique character: 
In determining whether a program is regionally targeted within 
the jurisdiction of the granting authority, consideration is given to 
the reasons why the program is directed only to certain segments 
. of that jurisdiction. If a program is directed to a certain region 
within the granting authority's jurisdiction because that region is 
the only one which could reasonably benefit from that type of pro-
gram or that region possessed certain characteristics which are 
unique in the jurisdiction, then the program may not be consid-
ered to be targeted.270 
266. Grain Corn from the United States (Final), supra note 244, at 1, 3. 
267. [d. at 3. 
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In applying the CVD criteria to the four programs that the Depart-
ment concluded were countervailable, the Department found in one in-
stance that a program was countervailable because it was targeted to a 
region whose characteristics were not unique in the United States,271 in 
two separate cases that specific crops were targeted,272 and on a final oc-
casion that grain corn itself was targeted.273 As for the other four pro-
grams that were found to confer a countervail able subsidy in the prelimi-
nary determination but which were dropped from the Department's final 
determination, three of those programs appeared to be regionally targeted 
(irrigation projects in the arid western states), and the unique nature of 
the area benefitted by the programs made them, in the Department's 
view, generally available.27• A fourth federal program, crop insurance, 
was shown to the satisfaction of the Department to be available for 
eighty-one percent of the crops grown in the United States, and was 
therefore also generally available.2711 The two state programs (state tax 
credits for fuel containing ethanol) for which there was insufficient infor-
mation at the preliminary stage of the Department's investigation were 
found not to confer a countervailable subsidy because the tax credits were 
available regardless of the feedstock used to produce the ethano1.276 
As a tool for predicting when a program will be deemed a countervail-
able subsidy, Appendix I of the final Grain Corn determination is only 
marginally helpful to petitioners and respondents involved in a CVD case, 
largely because the Appendix is an ipse dixit with no supporting rationale 
or explanation. On its face the Department's standard for determining 
whether a government program is countervailable turns on whether the 
program is de jure generally available. There is nothing in Appendix I of 
the Grain Corn case indicating that both de jure and de facto general 
availability are necessary in order to exempt a program from the scope of 
the CVD law. Thus, a program could be nominally generally available, 
but in fact be of benefit to only one industry, and yet not fall within the 
ambit of the CVD law. In addition, if benefits under a government pro-
gram are available to all persons in an industrial sector, such as agricul-
ture, they are likewise excepted from the reach of the CVD law. More-
over, programs that are targeted to a region may not be countervailable if 
it can be shown to the satisfaction of the Department that the region is the 
271. [d. app. II, al I. 
272. [d. app. II, al 2, 4. 
273. [d. app. II, at 11. 
274. [d. app. III, al 1-2. 
275. [d. app. III, al 2-3. 
276. [d. app. III, al 3. 
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only one that could benefit from the type of program involved or that the 
region possesses other unique characteristics. 
Why such regional programs are extended this exemption is somewhat 
puzzling from an economics standpoint, since market distortions may nev-
ertheless result when incentives are offered for locating an industry in a 
specific region even if that region is in some way "unique," hardly a self-
defining term. Given the inherent geographic and economic differences be-
tween any two regions, by definition every region is "unique." One expla-
nation for this exemption, of course, is that it takes into account regional 
development programs of the Canadian federal and provincial govern-
ments which, but for this regional program exemption, would be 
countervailable if the Canadian CVD law was applied to them. In order 
to avoid the embarrassment and inconsistency of countervailing another 
country's program when there is a parallel program in Canada, the crea-
tion of an exception in the CVD law for regional programs was not only 
necessary but a foregone conclusion. 
Finally, the "cost to government" criterion mentioned in Appendix I of 
the Department's preliminary Grain Corn determination was dropped 
without explanation from the final determination. 277 Section 2(1) of 
SIMA defines "subsidy" in terms of a benefit accruing to a person in the 
production, sale, transportation, or export of goods; it makes no reference 
to the cost to government of providing the benefit.278 The Deputy Minis-
ter probably derived his "cost to government" criterion from the EC prac-
tice of looking to whether a purported subsidy constitutes a burden on 
public funds. 279 The rationale for this "burden on public funds" criterion 
has been explained by two commentators as follows: 
If a subsidy were to be equated with all forms of government in-
tervention in the economy, this would lead, in the last resort, to 
the potential countervailability of any kind of state intervention, 
whether financial or merely regulatory, for example price controls 
or pollution standards.280 
Thus, requiring that there be a burden on public funds before any 
countervailable subsidy be found to exist is important, in the EC's view, 
277. Compare Grain Corn from the United States (Final), supra note 244, app. I with Grain 
Corn from the United States (Preliminary), supra note 246, app. I (demonstrating removal of "cost to 
government" criterion from the final determination of subsidizing). 
278. See supra notes 3 t -32 and accompanying text. 
279. See J. BESEl.ER & A. WIl.LlAMS, ANTI-DUMPING AND ANTI-SUBSIDY LAW: THE EURO-
PMN COMMUNITIES 123 (t 986). 
280. [d. 
1989) 735 
HeinOnline -- 20 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 736 1988-1989
LAW & POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
in order to place some limits both on countervailability in the first in-
stance and on calculating the amount of the subsidy in the second.281 This 
approach is not shared by the United States, however, which has rejected 
using a "cost to government" criterion in the administration of the U.S. 
CVD law, either in determining whether a program is countervailable or 
in calculating the amount of the subsidy. In both instances, the focus is on 
the benefit to recipient, not the cost to government.282 By dropping its 
earlier reference in the Grain Corn preliminary determination to the cost 
to government of providing the benefit, the Department has aligned its 
interpretation of the Canadian CVD law closely with that of the ITA, 
distancing itself from the EC approach. Not only does the Department 
ignore whether there has been a burden on public funds in addressing the 
question of countervailability vel non, it also looks exclusively to the bene-
fit to the recipient-not to whether there has been a charge on the public 
account-in calculating the amount of the subsidy.283 Paradoxically, how-
ever, the IT A has refused to countervail against government import re-
strictions which have the direct effect of allowing a domestic industry to 
raise home market prices and thereby lower export prices-a clear benefit 
to the domestic industry.284 Moreover, although the ITA refuses to em-
ploy a cost-to-government analysis in administering the CVD law, the 
illustrative list of countervailable domestic subsidies contained in the U.S. 
CVD law all turn on government bearing some financial burden. 
The Canadian Import Tribunal's Injury Finding In Grain Corn From 
the United States 
On March 6, 1987, the Canadian Import Tribunal issued an affirma-
tive injury finding in the Grain Corn case in a 2-1 split decision.281i The 
Import Tribunal concluded that U.S. grain corn was a cause of material 
injury to Canadian growers of grain corn, but not because subsidized im-
ports of U.S. grain corn had caused or were causing price suppression or 
depression. On the contrary, an affirmative injury determination was 
reached notwithstanding the fact that little if any U.S. grain corn was 
281. [d. at 144. 
282. See, e.g., Certain Carbon Steel Products from Mexico, 49 Fed. Reg. 5142, 5148-50 (Dep't 
Comm. 1984) (prelim. affirm. determination). 
283. See Grain Corn from the United States (Final), supra note 244, app. I, at 1-2. 
284. Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Sheet from Argentina, 48 Fed. Reg. 55,014, 55,015 (Dep't 
Comm. 1983) (initiation). 
285. Subsidized Grain Corn Originating in or Exported from the United States of America, 
Canadian Import Tribunal, Inq. No. CIT-7-86 (Mar. 6, 1986) [hereinafter Grain Corn Injury 
Finding]. 
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actually exported to Canada. The Import Tribunal based its affirmative 
finding primarily on evidence that major purchasers of Canadian grain 
corn wield grain corn prices set at the Chicago Board of Trade as a club 
with which they negotiate a lower price for grain corn from Canadian 
growers. 28S Because U.S. agricultural policies and programs reduced the 
price of U.S. grain corn (primarily the 1981 Farm Bill and the 1985 Food 
Security Act),287 and because the price of grain corn sold at the Chicago 
Board of Trade was in essence the U.S. price for this commodity, the 
Import Tribunal concluded that Canadian-grown corn prices were de-
pressed as a consequence,288 and at a level sufficiently low to constitute 
material injury. 289 
In response to the argument that SIMA and the Subsidies Code require 
that material injury result from subsidized imports and not simply from 
foreign government subsidization in general,290 the Import Tribunal an-
swered that the term "subsidized imports" as used in SIMA was broad 
enough to embrace potential or likely imports, not only actual imports of 
subsidized goods.291 "To do otherwise," the Tribunal added, 
would be to frustrate the purpose of the system. . . . The issue, 
therefore, is not whether imports have taken place, but whether 
they [U.S. grain corn imports] would have increased substantially 
in the absence of a price response by the domestic producers to the 
subsidized U.S. corn. Given the openness of the Canadian market, 
much higher levels of imports would have been a certainty.292 
286. Id. at 5. 
287. Id. at 12, 14. 
288. Id. at 14. 
289. Id. at 10, 14. 
290. Grain Corn Injury Finding, supra note 285, at 15. Article 6( 1) of the Subsidies Code 
provides: 
A determination of injury for purposes of Article VI of the General Agreement shall in-
volve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of subsidized imports and their effect 
on prices in the domestic market for like products and (b) the consequent impact of these 
imports on domestic producers of such products. 
Subsidies Code, supra note 12, art. 6, 31 U.S.T. at 527 (footnotes omitted). Articles 6(2) and 6(4) 
also refer to the volume of "subsidized imports" and require that a nexus between "subsidized im-
ports" and injury be established. Id. at 527-528. 
291. Grain Corn Injury Finding, supra note 285, at 16. 
292. Id. See also 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(VII), discussed supra note 195 and accompanying 
text. The U.S. law provides "any other demonstrable adverse trends that indicate the probability that 
the importation (or sale for importation) of the merchandise (whether or not it is actu.ally being 
imported at the time) will be the cause of actual injury ... . "Id. (emphasis added). 
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The Import Tribunal reached this conclusion notwithstanding that its 
own rules, which incorporate the injury tests contained in the Subsidies 
Code, refer to the impact on domestic prices of "the importation into Ca-
nada of ... subsidized goods.,,293 
In his dissenting opinion, Import Tribunal member Bissonnette was of 
the view that under SIMA and the Subsidies Code injury must relate to 
subsidized imports, not just to subsidized goods at large.29• Under his 
reading of Articles 4:4, 6: 1, 6:2, and 6:4 of the GATT Subsidies Code 
(provisions whose language is tracked closely in the Import Tribunals 
Rules), a necessary precondition to triggering the countervailing duty 
remedy is subsidized goods that cross national borders in international 
trade. 291i Reviewing U.S. and EC CVD laws, Bissonnette further noted 
that duties may only be imposed where a domestic industry has been in-
jured by reason of subsidized imports. 296 Turning to SIMA, Bissonnette 
stated that "[ t ]here are many provisions in SIMA relating to the proce-
dures of investigation and determination which only make sense in the 
context of a presence in Canada of subsidized imports. The investigation 
by Revenue Canada could not get off the ground without imports."297 
Because there was an insufficient volume of U.S. grain corn imports to 
Canada to constitute material injury, Bissonnette felt compelled to dissent 
from the majority's conclusion that U.S. grain corn was the cause of mate-
rial injury to Canadian grain corn growers.298 
Within days after publication of its affirmative injury decision in Grain 
Corn, the Import Tribunal issued a notice on March 20, 1987, that it 
would conduct a public interest inquiry commencing May 26, 1987, pur-
suant to 3ection 45 of SIMA, the first public interest inquiry ever con-
ducted by the Tribunal.299 The Tribunal is empowered to conduct such a 
proceeding if it believes that the imposition of countervailing duties in 
whole or in part might not be in the public interest, and to report its 
conclusions to the Minister of Finance for appropriate action. Because this 
was the first time the Tribunal had conducted a section 45 inquiry, it had 
to confront concepts such "public interest," and had to define its own role 
293. Canadian Import Tribunal Rules, rule 36(b)(iii), Reg. No. SOR/85-1068, 119 Can. Gaz. 
(part II) 4652, 4662 (Min. Fin. 1985) (emphasis added). 
294. Grain Corn Injury Finding, supra note 285, at 28. 
295. Jd. at 29. 
296. Jd. at 30. 
297. d. 
298. Jd. at 32-33. 
299. CANA[}JAN IMPORT TRIBUNAL, PUBI.IC INTERF.sT GRAIN CORN: REPORT OF THE CANA-
DIAN IMPORT TRIBUNAL UNDER SECTION 45 OF THE SPECIAL IMPORT MEASURES ACT 6 (Oct. 20, 
1987). 
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in fulfilling the responsibilities of section 45. Although neither SIMA nor 
the Tribunal's Rules define "public interest," the Tribunal rejected the 
notion that increased prices resulting from the imposition of counter-
vailing duties could, standing alone, constitute a sufficient ground for re-
mission or mitigation of the duty, but accepted an approach that focused 
on the impact of higher prices on user and consumer groups.300 The Tri-
bunal added that it did not consider a section 45 inquiry to be an adver-
sarial one: 
[T]he Tribunal does not view the section 45 process as a contest 
between the parties. Rather, the Tribunal concluded that the re-
sponsibility imposed on it by section 45 requires it to analyze and 
evaluate the consequences flowing from the application of the 
countervailing duty, for all parties affected, and, by weighing the 
relative merits of each, to form an opinion as to whether, and 
how, on balance, the public interest would best be served.301 
The Tribunal received submissions from Canadian producer, user, con-
sumer, and governmental groups.302 In assessing the impact of the 
US$O.84 per bushel CVD, the Tribunal found that Canadian corn pro-
ducers could not capture the full amount of the CVD in their exports of 
grain corn because of the dominance of the United States in that market, 
thus forcing down the price of Canadian grain corn exports.303 Turning to 
the domestic market, the Tribunal concluded that the CVD might allow 
the price of Canadian grain corn to rise modestly. However, feed users 
would then use relatively cheaper substitute grains and thereby free sup-
plies of domestic corn for industrial users who cannot use these substi-
tutes.304 "The net effect of the duty on the domestic price of corn is there-
fore modest," the Tribunal observed.30Ii In balancing the interests of the 
producer and various user groups within Canada, the Tribunal recom-
mended a CVD of CAN$O.30 per bushel, summing up as follows: 
Both Canadian corn producers and Canadian corn users would 
benefit by a reduction in the present level of the countervailing 
duty. With such action, uncertainty and risk to users would be 
largely mitigated and would be beneficial to corn producers as 
300. Id. at 2, 35. 
30\. Id. at 3. 
302. Id. at 9-19. 
303. Id. at 35. 
304. Id. at 45. 
305. Id. 
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well because of the greater ensuing market stability. A counter-
vailing duty set at the market-generated price premium would not 
result in any meaningful loss of revenue to the corn producers. 
Therefore, reducing the countervailing duty is not a zero-sum 
game. It is a positive-sum game that benefits both producers and 
users. The Tribunal concludes from this analysis that the public 
interest would be served by a reduction in the countervailing 
duty.30s 
In response to the Import Tribunal's recommendation, the Minister of 
State for Finance lowered the CVD from CAN$1.10 to CAN$0.46 per 
bushel on February 4, 1988.307 (The reason for the variance between the 
Minister of Finance's mitigated CVD and that recommended by the. Tri-
bunal was that the price of grain corn had risen to CAN$0.46 per bushel 
since the Tribunal's public interest report had been published.) The new 
CVD was set at the CAN$0.46 per bushel rate in order to permit produc-
ers to capture the price benefits associated with the duty, the Minister of 
Finance explained.30s On November 7, 1988, the Department of Finance 
made this change in duty rate retroactive to cover the entire countervail 
period.309 
The Commerce Department's Administration of the CVD Law 
Before examining two CVD determinations by the IT A involving goods 
imported from Canada, the ITA's treatment of domestic subsidies and the' 
court decisions treating this question will be briefly summarized.310 In a 
nutshell, the ITA takes the view that generally available domestic subsi-
dies are not countervail able. In assessing whether a benefit is generally 
available, the program must be both generally available nominally and in 
fact. 311 This administrative practice was codified in the Omnibus Trade 
306. Id. at 46. 
307. Canadian Government Agrees to Lower Rate of Countervailing Duty Levied on U.S. 
Corn, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 165 (Feb. 10, 1988). 
308. Id. at 166. 
309. Cut in Countervailing Duty on U.S. Corn Will Be Made Retroactive, Minister Says, 5 
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1500 (Nov. 16, 1988). 
310. For the general principles used by the ITA in making subsidy determinations, see Cold 
Rolled Carbon Steel Flat-Rolled Products from Argentina, 49 Fed. Reg. 18,006, 18,016 app. (Dep't 
Comm. 1984) (final affirm. determination). See generally Jameson, The Administration of the U.S. 
Countervailing Duty Laws With Regard to Domestic Subsidies: Where It's Been, Where It Is, Where 
It May Go, 12 SVR. J. INT'L L. & COM. 59 (1985). 
311. See generally Bello & Holmer, The Specificity Dialogue Continues, 22 INT'L LAW. 563 
(1988); Cameron & Berg, The U.S. Countervailing Duty Law and the Principle of General Availa-
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and Competitiveness Act of 1988.312 Regional programs within a jurisdic-
tion (e.g., within part of a province or nation) are countervailable if pref-
erential. Benefits given to just one industry are countervailable. In essence, 
the question the ITA asks is whether the program grants a preference to 
an industry or geographic region within a national economy.313 
The jurisprudence of the U.S. Court of International Trade on this 
question, although in seeming disarray because of widely varying dicta, 
essentially endorses the ITA's approach. Although the Court of Interna-
tional Trade had criticized the ITA's interpretation of the definition of 
"subsidy," the differences between the Court and the ITA are more se-
mantic than substantive. Their disagreement centers on the somewhat 
misleading and probably misnamed "general availability rule." From the 
Court's decision in Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States,3H where 
the Court found two Korean tax depreciation schemes to be generally 
available and therefore not countervailable, to Cabot Corp. v. United 
States,31& where the Court endorsed a de facto and de jure analytical ap-
proach to the question of countervailability, the opinions have as a 
group316 turned on whether the government program was preferential ei-
bility, 19 J. WORLD TRADE L. 497 (1985). 
312. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1312, 102 Stat. 
1107, 1184-85 (1988). Section 1312 amends section 771 (5) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 by 
adding the following provision: 
Id. 
(B) SPECIAL RULE.-In applying subparagraph (A), the administering authority [the 
ITA], in each investigation, shall determine whether the bounty, grant, or subsidy in law 
or in fact is provided to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or indus-
tries. Nominal general availability, under the terms of the law, regulation, program, or 
rule establishing a bounty, gram, or subsidy, of the benefits thereunder is not a basis for 
determining that the bounty, grant, or subsidy is not, or has not been, in fact provided to a 
specific enterprise or industry, or group thereof. 
The House Conference Report to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 stated that 
the amendment "clarifies the application of the countervailing duty law to domestic subsidies by re-
quiring that the Commerce Department base its determination on whether a particular subsidy is in 
fact bestowed upon a specific industry or group of industries, or instead is bestowed upon industries in 
general." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 587, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1547, 1620. 
313. Carbon Black from Mexico, 51 Fed. Reg. 13,269, 13,272 app. (Dep't Comm. 1986) (pre-
lim. admin. review). See also Cameron & Berg, supra note 311. 
314. 5 C.I.T. 229, 564 F. Supp. 834 (1983). 
315. 9 C.I.T. 489, 620 F. Supp. 722 (1985). 
316. See also Alberta Pork Producers' Marketing Board V. United States, 11 C.LT. __ , 669 
F. Supp. 445 (1987); PPG Industries, Inc. V. United States, 11 C.LT. __ , 662 F. Supp. 258 
(1987); AI Tech Specialty Steel Corp. V. United States, 11 C.LT. __ , 661 F. Supp 1206 (1987). 
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ther to an industry or to a geographic region. With a 1988 amendment to 
the definition of "subsidy,"817 the apparent gulf between the Court and 
the ITA should now be bridged. 
With this brief overview of the ITA's approach to determining whether 
a program or benefit constitutes a countervailable subsidy, this article next 
addresses the first of two ITA CVD determinations which involved lm-
ports from Canada. 
Subsidy Determinations by the Commerce Department 
Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada 
In what was considered in some quarters to be a dramatic reversal that 
took just under four years to execute, in 1986 the ITA released its prelim-
inary affirmative CVD determination in Certain Softwood Lumber Prod-
ucts from Canada.8lS This determination generated more shrill cries and 
displays of outrage from the Canadian government and lumber industry 
than any ITA determination issued prior to or since. Had it not been for 
the fact that the ITA had just three years earlier issued a negative CVD 
determination for the same product, and had 'it not been for the fact that 
the United States and Canada were actively engaged in negotiating a free 
trade agreement, the Canadian reaction might not have been so vociferous. 
Indeed, the coincidence of the Deputy Minister's preliminary Grain Corn 
determination and the ITA's preliminary Softwood Lumber determina-
tion, coming less than a month apart, cast a pall over the free trade nego-
tiations. Only with termination of the Softwood Lumber case319 upon the 
successful conclusion of an agreement between Canada and the United 
States under which Canada agreed to impose an export tax of fifteen per-
cent ad valorem on exports of softwood lumber products destined for the 
United States did the free trade negotiations become less confronta-
tional. 820 How was the ITA able to reverse itself in so brief a time? A 
review of the ITA's 1983 Softwood Lumber determination and the evolu-
But set Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 7 C.I.T. 339, 590 F. Supp. 1237, 1241-42 (1984) 
, (where the Court in dictum rejected the general availability test). See Kennedy, An Examination of 
Domestic Subsidies and the Standard for Imposing Countervailing Duties, 9 LoY. L.A. INT'L & 
COMPo L.J. 1 (1986). 
317. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1328, 1988 U.S. 
CODt: CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS (102 stat.) 1107. 
318. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,453 (Dep't Comm. 
1986) (prelim. affirm. determination). 
319. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 52 Fed. Reg. 315 (Dep't Comm. 1987) 
(termination). 
320. See generally Holmer & Bello, supra note 7. 
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tion of its administrative practice under the CVD law in the intervening 
three years furnishes some clues to this puzzle.32~ 
On October 7, 1982, the U.S. Coalition for Fair Canadian Lumber 
Imports filed a CVD petition with the ITA on behalf of a number of U.S. 
softwood lumber producers.322 After the ITA initiated its investigation, 
the ITC determined on November 22, 1982, that there was a reasonable 
indication that imports of softwood lumber products from Canada were 
materially injuring U.S. producers of the like products.323 The ITA in 
turn reached a negative preliminary determination on March 11, 1983.324 
During the final phase of its CVD investigation, the ITA did find that 
several federal and provincial programs conferred countervailable subsi-
dies, but their cumulative total did not reach the ITA's de minimis thresh-
old of 0.5 percent ad valorem.32 r> Consequently, its final determination 
was negative.326 Among the federal programs investigated were an invest-
ment tax credit for the purchase of capital assets that was limited in cer-
tain cases to companies located within a specific region;327 a travel ex-
pense sharing program available to manufacturers which export;328 and a 
regional development incentive program created for the purpose of allevi-
ating unemployment in areas of Canada where employment and economic 
opportunity had been chronically low, but which was limited to compa-
nies in specific regions.329 Among the provincial programs examined by 
the ITA were a low-interest small business loan program sponsored by 
British Columbia, available to companies located within specific regions of 
the province and on terms inconsistent with commercial considerations 
(i.e., on a preferential basis);330 a stumpage payment deferral program 
sponsored by the British Columbia Government limited to companies lo-
cated within a specific region of the province and on terms inconsistent 
321. See id. for a summary of the Softwood Lumber determinations. 
322. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,878 (Dep't Comm. 
1982) (initiation). 
323. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, Inq. No. 701-TA-197, USITC Pub. 
1320 (Nov. 1982). 
324. Certain Softwood Products From Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,395 (Dep't Comm. 1983) (pre-
lim. neg. determination) as amended by Certain Softwood Products From Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 
11,731 (Dep't Comm. 1983) (prelim. neg. determination). 
325. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159, 24,160-61 (Dep't 
Comm. 1983) (final neg. determination). 
326. The final negative determination became effective May 31, 1893. [d. at 24,159. 
327. [d. at 24,161. 
328. [d. 
329. [d. at 24,162. 
330. [d. at 24,163-64. 
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with commercial considerations;Ssl a stumpage payment deferral program 
sponsored by the Ontario Government available only to sawmills and on 
terms inconsistent with commercial considerations (either being sufficient 
for a finding of countervailability);SS2 and loans and loan guarantees from 
the Quebec Government targeted to a provincial Crown corporation on 
terms inconsistent with commercial considerations.sss 
By far the most important item on the U.S. petitioner's countervai-
lability agenda were various stumpage programs of the Canadian federal 
and provincial governments. ("Stumpage programs" refer to the system by 
which individuals and companies acquire rights to cut and remove 
"stumpage," Le., standing timber, from government forest land.)SS4 The 
petitioner was unsuccessful, however, in selling its position to the Com-
merce Department, either on the basis that these programs were a 
countervailable domestic subsidy- or an illegal export subsidy. The ITA 
rejected out of hand the contention that stumpage programs confer an ex-
port subsidy apparently because they were not de jure intended to stimu-
late export sales, such as being contingent upon export performance. In 
the ITA's words, "The mere fact that significant quantities of products 
made from stumpage are exported to the U.S. does not mean that stump-
age programs confer an export subsidy."SSG Thus, even if the programs 
had a stimulative effect on the Canadian lumber industry that indirectly 
boosted lumber exports, absent an intention to promote lumber exports a 
program could not be considered a prohibited export subsidy, in the ITA's 
view. The position taken by the ITA on this score is probably sound, 
considering that government promotion of international trade figures into 
virtually every national economy in the world. If the Administration's po-
sition were otherwise, virtually any government program that had the ef-
fect of increasing the domestic output of the manufacturing sector of the 
economy, and as a by-product increasing exports, could be labelled an 
unlawful export subsidy. At the same time, governments that might thus 
be tempted to target an industry whose entire output could not possibly be 
absorbed by the domestic economy, while they might avoid the export sub-
sidy pitfall, would be snared by the domestic subsidy net. 
In support of a finding that a countervailable subsidy had been be-
stowed on the Canadian lumber industry, the U.S. domestic industry ar-
gued that the stumpage programs conferred a countervailable subsidy be-
331. [d. at 24,164. 
332. [d .. 
333. [d. at 24,165. 
334. [d. at 24,167 n.2. 
335. [d. at 24,167. 
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cause it was available only to a specific enterprise or industry, thus 
coming within the definition of "subsidy" contained in the U.S. CVD 
law.33s The ITA disagreed that the stumpage programs were not gener-
ally available, finding that the programs "are available within Canada on 
similar terms regardless of the industry or enterprise of the recipient. "337 
Furthermore, the ITA added, even if they were only available to a specific 
industry, the stumpage programs nevertheless did not confer a domestic 
subsidy because they did not provide goods at preferential rates.33S 
With regard to the general availability question, the ITA undertook 
both de jure and de facto availability analyses of the stumpage programs, 
concluding that: 
Any current limitations on use are not due to activities of the Ca-
nadian governments .... The only limitations as to the types of 
industries that use stumpage reflect the inherent characteristics of 
this natural resource and the current level of technology. As tech-
nological advances have increased the potential users of standing 
timber, stumpage has been made available to the new users.339 
Thus, there was no public law which bars access to stumpage in Canada. 
Appreciating that nominal general availability of a program alone is 
not dispositive of the countervailability question, the ITA proceeded to an 
analysis of whether stumpage was used within Canada by several groups 
of industries.340 The ITA found that at least three industries used stump-
age in Canada: 
Stumpage is cut by the lumber and wood products industries ... , 
the veneer, plywood and building board industries, the pulp and 
paper industries ... , and the furniture manufacturing industries, 
each of which requires different types of processing equipment 
and uses different channels of trading .... In this regard, we note 
also that, under the classification systems of both Canada and the 
United States, the lumber and wood products industries, the pulp 
and paper industries, and the furniture manufacturing industries 
constitute at least three groups of industries. Therefore, in view of 
its general availability without governmental limitation and its use 
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by wide-ranging and diverse industries, we determine that stump-
age is not provided to a "specific group of ... industries."341 
Although this conclusion would have been sufficient to support its de-
termination that stumpage programs were not countervailable, the ITA 
took its analysis one step further by addressing the issue of whether 
stumpage was provided at preferential rates342 within the meaning of sec-
tion 771(S)(B)(ii) of the Act.343 In brief, because stumpage was not pro-
vided within Canada to some on terms more favorable than to others, 
there was no preferential treatment, in the ITA's opinion.344 The peti-
tioner had argued that the stumpage program constituted an assumption 
of a cost of manufacture by the Canadian government in violation of sec-
tion 771(5)(B)(iv).346 The ITA disagreed, concluding that subsections (i)-
(iv) were mutually exclusive and that if anyone of these four subsections 
was applicable it would have to be subsection (ii) because it clearly cov-
ered programs that involved the provision of raw goods.346 Although the 
IT A stated that it was impossible for more than one of the subsections to 
apply in a given case, it still considered and rejected the petitioner's argu-
ment that stumpage programs were an "assumption of any costs or ex-
penses of manufacture," in violation of section 771(S)(B)(iv): 
We believe that the most reasonable interpretation of "assump-
tion" is that it refers only to government activity which relieves an 
enterprise or industry of a pre-existing statutory or contractual 
obligation. Otherwise, subsection (iv) would embrace all of the ac-
tivities described in preceding subsection (i)-(iii), because the ac-
tivities described in those subsections could all be regarded as ac-
tivities which reduce or absorb-and thereby arguably 
"assume"-costs of production.347 
In short, the stumpage programs impose a cost on producers, rather than 
assume a cost for them. 
Moreover, the ITA continued, the stumpage programs could only re-
present some cost assumption by the Canadian governments concerned if 
341. /d. 
342. [d. 
343. 19 U.S.C. 1677(S)(B)(ii) (1982). 
344. 48 Fed. Reg. at 24,167-68. 
345. [d. at 24,167. Subsection 771(5)(B)(iv) is codified at 19 U.S.C. 1677(5)(b)(iv) (1982). 
346. 48 Fed. Reg. at 24,167. 
347. [d. at 24,167-68. 
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they resulted in cost reduction to producers.348 This, the ITA concluded, 
was not the case. The ITA then declined petitioner's invitation to use a 
cross-border cost comparison between U.S. lumber users and their Cana-
dian counterparts.349 Not only would such a cross-border comparison be 
inappropriate given the variations in timber stands and tree species 
throughout North America, the IT A stated, but such a comparison would 
be irrational because prices for timber in U.S. forests have been bid on 
anywhere from two to five years in advance of the cut, without taking into 
account market fluctuations in demand for timber.360 In British Columbia, 
on the other hand, the price for stumpage is determined by using a 
residual value calculation, derived by deducting manufacturing costs, nor-
mal profit, and other risk factors from the end-product price.351 This 
methodology, the ITA believed, although different from the majority of 
u.s. pricing methods, was nonetheless a reasonable one for establishing 
stumpage prices.362 
In summary, the ITA determined that Canadian stumpage programs 
(with two exceptions) did no~ confer an export subsidy because they: (1) 
were not contingent upon export performance; (2) did not confer a domes-
tic subsidy because they were not provided to a specific enterprise or in-
dustry, or group of enterprises or industries; and (3) did not confer a do-
mestic subsidy because in any event they were neither preferential nor did 
they represent an assumption by government of a production cost within 
the meaning of section 771(S)(B)(iv). 
Undaunted by this administrative rebuff, the U.S. domestic lumber in-
dustry refiled their petition in 1986, once again challenging these same 
stumpage programs.353 Thus, in the midst of the very delicate Canada-
U.S. free trade negotiations, the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports filed 
a CVD petition on behalf of the U.S. lumber industry on May 19, 1986, 
alleging that Canadian manufacturers, producers, and exporters of soft-
wood lumber products were receiving domestic subsidies.364 In a reprise of 
its earlier investigation, the ITA once again examined the various provin-
cial stumpage programs to determine whether they were provided to a 
specific group of industries and whether they constituted the provision of 





353. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,453, 37,454 (Dep't 
Comm. 1986) (prelim. affirm. determination). 
354. Id. 
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goods at preferential rates under subsection' 771 (S)(B)(ii).slili The ITA re-
affirmed that specificity was the benchmark against which alleged domes-
tic subsidies would continue to be measured, and elaborated on the factors 
it considers when addressing the specificity question: 
(1) The extent to which a foreign government acts to limit the 
availability of a program; (2) the number of enterprises, indus-
. tries, or groups thereof which actually use a program, which may 
'include the examination of disproportionate or dominant users; 
and (3) the extent to which the government exercises discretion in 
making the program available. Sli6 
Having received what it deemed to be inadequate responses from the 
provincial governments, the ITA relied on the best evidence available (the 
responses it received from the respondents and the information supplied 
by the petitioner), drawing inferences from that information, in reaching 
its preliminary determination.sli7 On the question of specificity, the peti-
tioner alleged that the provincial governments' exercise of discretion in 
issuing stumpage licenses had resulted in a specific group of industries 
having access to stumpage.31i6 "While the existence of discretion does not 
per se mean that a benefit is specific," the ITA acknowledged, "when the' 
discretion results in the targeting of a specific enterprise or industry or 
group of enterprises or industries, then that program is countervail-
able."31i9 In other words, de facto specificity is sufficient in order for a 
domestic program to be countervailable. The petitioner alleged that gov-
ernment discretion skewed the allocation of stumpage rights to favor the 
domestic lumber industry to the exclusion of other industries within Ca-
nada.360 The evidence proffered by the petitioner showed that the Alberta, 
British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec provincial governments required 
many successful applicants to process cut logs in sawmills.s61 This prac-
tice, the ITA concluded, constituted targeting.362 Aware that it was rush-
ing headlong toward a determination that would in effect overrule its 
355. [d. at 37,455. Subsection 771(5)(B)(ii) is codified at 19 U.S.C. 1677(5)(B)(ii) (1982). 
356. [d. at 37,456. 
357. [d. Compare what the ITA did in this instance with what the Deputy Minister did when 
faced with the parallel situation in the preliminary phase of the Grain Corn case. See Grain Corn 
Injury Finding, supra note 285. 
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1983 Softwood Lumber determination, the ITA distinguished the two 
cases by invoking the canard of "new evidence" as the explanation: 
While in -Softwood Products we determined that stumpage was 
used by the lumber and wood products industries, the pulp and 
paper industries, and furniture manufacturing industries, the rec-
ord of the current investigation indicates an undisputed fact: fur-
niture manufacturers own negligible rights, if they hold rights at 
all, to stumpage in any of the four relevant provinces. Thus, con-
trary to our determination in Softwood Products, the industries 
actually using provincial stumpage do not include the furniture 
manufacturing industries.383 
Having thus narrowed the field by one, the ITA next proceeded to 
dovetail the lumber industry and the paper and pulp industry into a sin-
gle, integrated industry: 
Another situation not noted in the earlier proceeding is the inte-
gration of the lumber and pulp and paper industries. The re-
sponses indicate that the lumber and pulp and paper companies 
tend to be horizontally integrated into single enterprises. Integra-
tion, in part, results from the complementary production process 
involved in timber processing: wood chips, by-products of lumber' 
production, are the primary input product for the production of 
pulp.384 
The IT A thus concluded that the provincial stumpage programs were 
provided to a specific group of enterprises or industries as a result of the 
discretionary allocation of licenses by the provincial governments.3811 
The ITA next had to determine whether stumpage was provided at 
preferential rates. Although its preferred methodology is to look for gov-
ernment price discrimination within the jurisdiction, the ITA was unable 
to conclude that under the circumstances of this case that particular 
benchmark would be appropriate because of the limited number of users 
and the qualitative differences between stands of lumber (such differences 
arguably accounting for any apparent price differences).388 The agency 
therefore turned to its Preferentiality Appendix, a part of the ITA's Car-
363. Id. 
364. Id. at 37,456-57. 
365. Id. at 37,457. 
366. Id. 
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bon Black from Mexico determination,387 for alternative tests to evaluate 
whether a government is providing a good or service at a preferential 
rate. 368 The ITA settled on the government's cost of producing the good as 
the appropriate benchmark in this case, and concluded that stumpage was 
provided at preferential rates. 369 Although the provincial governments in-
curred no direct costs in connection with the trees and land on which they 
grow, the IT A found that they have an intrinsic value equal to the com-
petitive bid prices obtained for the right to cut stumpage.370 From the bid-
price figures were deducted the expenditures incurred by each province to 
maintain commercial timberland and to administer the stumpage pro-
grams.371 The difference was the benefit recd~ed by the private licensees, 
which was preliminarily determined to be 14:5 percent ad valorem.372 
Based on its investigation of t':Velve other federal and provincial programs 
(most of which were the focus of its 1983 investigation), the ITA esti-
mated a net subsidy of fifteen percent ad valorem and issued an affirma-
tive preliminary CVD determination on October 22, 1986.373 
Confronted with this administrative about-:-face, and knowing full well 
that the final determination would be affirmative, on the day that the 
ITA's final determination in Softwood Lumber was due, Canada con-
cluded a memorandum of understanding with the United States under the 
terms of which Canada agreed to collect a fifteen percent export tax on all 
exports of softwood lumber products to the United States. With this 
agreement in place, the petitioner withdrew its CVD petition, thus termi-
nating the proceedings under section 704(a)(1) of the ACt. 374 
367. Carbon Black from Mexico, 51 Fed. Reg. 13,269,13,272 app. (Dep't Comm. 1986) (prelim. 
admin. review). 
368. The four alternative tests outlined in the Preferentiality Appendix are: (1) prices charged 
by the government for a similar or related good, (2) prices charged within the jurisdiction by other 
sellers for an identical good or service, (3) the government's cost of producing the good or service, and 
(4) external prices. [d. at 13,272-73. 
369. 51 Fed. Reg. at 37,457. 
370. [d. at 37,457-58. 
371. [d. 
372. [d. at 37,458. 
373. [d. at 37,458-63, 37,467. The ITC had previously found in July 1986, that there was a 
reasonable indication that an industry in the United States was materially injured by reason of the 
lumber imports from Canada. Softwood Lumber From Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,752 (Dep't Comm. 
1986) (import investigation). 
374. 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(a) (1982). 
750 [Vol. 20 
HeinOnline -- 20 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 751 1988-1989
COUNTER V AILING DUTY REGIME 
\ 
Cross-Cumulation of Imports of CVD and Antidumping Investigations 
Industrial Phosphoric Acid From Belgium and Israel 
This section reviews ITA and Commission determinations in a Jomt 
antidumping and CVD cases involving imports from Belgium and Israel. 
The significance of these consolidated investigations for the future admin-
istration of the U.S. CVD law with respect to Canada is tremendous, 
given that imports of like products from two or more countries may be 
cumulated for the purpose of determining material injury to the domestic 
industry.371i In Industrial Phosphoric Acid from Belgium and Israel,376 
two American producers of industrial phosphoric acid, FMC Corporation 
and Monsanto Corporation, filed a petition on November 5, 1986, on be-
half of the U.S. industry with the ITA and the ITC alleging that imports 
of industrial phosphoric acid from Belgium and Israel were being sold at 
less than fair value in the United States and were being unlawfully subsi-
dized, causing injury to the American industry.377 The ITC reached pre-
liminary affirmative injury determinations that there was a reasonable in-
dication that an industry in the United States is materially injured by 
reason of the industrial phosphoric acid imports on December 22, 1986.378 
The ITA reached final determinations of sales at less than fair value with 
respect to industrial phosphoric acid from. Belgium and Israel on July 7, 
1987.379 With regard to the subsidization phase of its investigation, the. 
375. That such cumulation can occur in the case of Canadian imports is not a remote possibility. 
See, e.g., Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, Canada, and Taiwan, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-255, 
-256,731-TA-275 to -277 (prelim.), USITC Pub. 1747 (Sept. 1985). For two additional cases involv-
ing Canadian imports and cumulation, see Certain Brass Sheets and Strips from Brazil, Canada, 
France, italy, the Republic of Korea, Sweden, and West Germany, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-269, -270, 731-
TA-311 to -317 (prelim.), USITC Pub. 1837 (May 1986); Iron Construction Castings from Brazil, 
Canada, India, and the People's Republic of China, lnv. Nos. 701-TA-249, 731-TA-262 to -265 
(prelim.), USITC Pub. 1720 Uune 1985). For other cases where the Commission has developed and 
applied its cumulation criteria, see, e.g., Certain Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from India, 
Taiwan, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-251 to -253, 731-TA-271 to -274 (prelim.), 
USITC Pub. 1742 (Aug. 1985); Certain Cast-Iron Pipe Fittings from Brazil, The Republic of Korea, 
and Taiwan, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-278 to -281 (prelim.), USITC Pub. 1753 (Sept. 1985); Certain Steel 
Wire Nails from the People's Republic of China, Poland, and Yugoslavia, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-266 to-
268 (prelim.), USITC Pub. 1730 Uuly 1985); Certain Carbon Steel Products from Austria and Swe-
den, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-225, 227-228, 230-231, 731-TA-219 (fina\), USITC Pub. 1759 (Sept. 1985). 
376. Industrial Phosphoric Acid from Belgium and Israel, 52 Fed. Reg. 6631 (ITC 1987) (initi-
ation final investigation). 
377. [d. at 6631. 
378. Industrial Phosphoric Acid from Belgium and Israel, 52 Fed. Reg. 612 (ITC 1987) (final 
determination). 
379. Industrial Phosphoric Acid from Belgium, 52 Fed. Reg. 25,436 (Dep't Comm. 1987) (final 
determination); Industrial Phosphoric Acid from Israel, 52 Fed. Reg. 25,440 (Dep't Comm. 1987) 
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ITA reached a final negative CVD determination with respect to 
Belgium,380 but an affirmative determination for Israe1.381 Final affirma-
tive injury determinations were reached by the lTC, resulting in the im-
position of a 14.67 percent antidumping duty on Belgian imports,382 a 
1.77 percent antidumping duty on imports from Israel,383 and a counter-
vailing duty of 15.11 percent for one Israeli industrial phosphoric acid 
producer and a 5.36 percent countervailing duty for all other Israeli in-
dustrial phosphoric acid producers. 384 
In its CVD investigation of industrial phosphoric acid imports from 
Belgium, the ITA determined that no benefits which constitute subsidies 
were being provided to Belgian producers.3811 The programs which the 
ITA investigated included an equity investment and an equity infusion 
program sponsored by the regional government of Wallonie, neither of 
which was made on terms inconsistent with commercial considerations 
and thus were not in violation of 771(5)(B)(i) of the Act.386 The ITA 
investigated a short-term lending program sponsored by a Belgian govern-
ment lending institution and found that these loans were not made at in-
terest rates lower than those charged on short-term credit lines from pri-
vate sources.387 
In the ITA's final affirmative CVD determination of industrial 
phosphoric acid from Israel, the IT A found five government programs 
that conferred a countervailable subsidy. One program provided capital 
investment grants, but only businesses located in two regions of Israel 
(final determination). 
380. Industrial Phosphoric Acid From Belgium, 52 Fed. Reg. 25,443 (Dep't Comm. 1987) (final 
neg. determination). 
381. Industrial Phosphoric Acid From Israel, 52 Fed. Reg. 25,447 (Dep't Comm. 1987) (final 
affirm. determination). 
382. Phosphoric Acid From Belgium, 52 Fed. Reg. at 25,440. 
383. Phosphoric Acid From Israel, 52 Fed. Reg. at 25,443. 
384. Phosphoric Acid From Israel, 52 Fed. Reg. at 25,455. The ITA had reached a preliminary 
affirmative CVD determination, and accordingly ordered suspension of liquidation of IPA entries. 
The final CVD determination was extended to coincide with the companion antidumping duty inves-
tigation of the same product. However, Article 5(3} of the GATT Subsidies Code does not permit the 
imposition of provisional measures for more than four months. The ITA accordingly terminated the 
suspension of liquidation of IPA entries on June 5,1987,120 days after its February 5, 1987, prelim-
inary affirmative CVD determination when it first ordered suspension of liquidation. Id. at 25,454. 
The ITA and ITC determinations were affirmed by the Court of International Trade in Negev 
Phosphates Ltd. v. Commerce Department, Slip Op. 88-156 (Nov. 8, 1988). 
385. Neger Phosphates Ltd. v. U.S. Comm. Dep't, No. 88-156, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade Nov. 8, 
1988). 
386. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5}(B}(i} (1982). See Industrial Phosphoric Acid From Belgium, 52 Fed. 
Reg. at 25,444. 
387. Id. al 25,445. 
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were eligible.388 Another provided long-term loans at preferential interest 
rates to enterprises located in two development zones within Israe1.389 A 
third program extended loans to exporters at preferential rates. 390 A 
fourth program provided exchange rate risk insurance to exporters at pre-
miums inadequate to cover the program's long-term operating costs and 
losses. 391 The fifth program made research and development grants avail-
able to manufacturers and producers within Israel, but the results of such 
research were not publicly available and were therefore countervailable.592 
The three programs that the ITA found not to confer subsidies included a 
generally available accelerated depreciation scheme393 and the provision of 
rail facilities by the Israeli Government which, although provided to a 
specific industry in this case (the chemical industry), was not at preferen-
tial rates. 59. 
In the lTC's final injury determination the Commissioners split 3-2 on 
the issue of material injury vel non.396 The majority (Commissioners 
Eckes, Lodwick, and Rohr) based its affirmative injury determination pri-
marily on three factors: (1) the overall decline in the domestic industry's 
performance, (2) the increased volume and market share of the Belgian 
and Israeli industrial phosphoric acid imports, and (3) underselling of the 
domestic product by the imports causing price suppression and price de-
pression.398 In determining the condition of the domestic industry, the ma-
jority found that apparent consumption had declined, domestic production 
had dropped as had the domestic industry's capacity, and the number of 
employees working in the industry had declined during the period of 
investigation. 397 
388. Phosphoric Acid From Israel, 52 Fed. Reg. at 25,448. 
389. Id. 
390. /d. at 25,449. 
391. Id. at 25,449-50. 
392. /d. at 25,450. 
393. /d. 
394. /d. at 25,450-51. 
395. Although there were only five Commissioners participating in this particular injury investi-
gation, the normal composition of the ITC is six Commissioners. In the event of evenly divided Com-
mission, the Commission is deemed to have made an affirmative determination. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(11). 
396. Industrial Phosphoric Acid From Belgium and Israel, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-286, 731-TA-365 
to -366 (final), USITC Pub. 2000, at 3 (Aug. 1987) [hereinafter Industrial Phosporic Acid]. 
397. [d. at 8- 13. In her dissenting opinion, Vice Chairman Brunsdale noted that although the 
financial data show declines in net sales, gross profits, operating income, and net income before taxes, 
none of the U.S. firms reported operating losses during the period of investigation. [d. at 45. Thus, 
even though profits were down from previous high levels, because the industry was currently perform-
ing strongly, the evidence failed to make a clear case that the domestic industry is suffering material 
injury, in Vice Chairman Brunsdale's view. /d. at 45-46. 
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In assessing the performance of the imports in the U.S. market .and 
their impact on the domestic industry, the majority cumulated the Belgian 
and Israeli products pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iv), finding that 
the imports competed with each other and with the domestic product, and 
. that the imports are marketed within a reasonably coincident period. (In 
this instance the Commission cross-cumulated since the imports were the 
subject of a concurrent CVD and antidumping injury investigation).398 
The factors which the Commission considers in determining whether the 
imported products compete with each other and with the like domestic 
product in the U.S. market include the following: 
(1) the degree of fungibility between imports from different coun-
tries and between imports and the domestic like product, including 
consideration for specific customer requirements and other quality 
related questions; 
(2) the presence of sales or offers to sell in the same geographical 
markets of imports from different countries and the domestic like 
product; 
(3) the existence of common or similar channels of distribution of 
imports from different countries and the domestic like product; 
(4) whether the imports are simultaneously present in the 
market. 399 
Notwithstanding the contention of the respondents that Belgian and Is-
raeli imports did not compete with each other because they are sold in 
different geographical markets, the Commission concluded that, to the 
contrary, both Belgian and Israeli industrial phosphoric acid imports com-
peted with each other, each being imported to the United States at ports 
within a SOO-mile radius of each other.40o 
Turning finally to the question of material injury caused by the imports 
under investigation, the Commission noted initially that even though the 
volume of industrial phosphoric acid imports might be small, they could 
nevertheless be a cause of material injury to the domestic industry given 
its fragile economic health.'ol The Commission added that price was a 
major factor in the decision to purchase industrial phosphoric acid, and 
that Belgian and Israeli products had generally been priced below the do-
398. See Bingham & Taylor, Div. of Virginia Indus., Inc. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 793 
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1986), affd, 815 F.2d 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
399. Industrial Phosphoric Acid, supra note 396, at 13-14. 
400. Id. at 14-16. 
401. Id. at 18. 
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mestic product.40Il This factor, in addition to the overall weakness of the 
domestic industry, led the Commission to conclude that industrial 
phosphoric acid imports had materially injured the domestic industry in 
the form of price suppression and price depression, which in turn reduced 
the profitability of the domestic industry.403 
In the dissenting views of Chairman Liebeler, the majority had essen-
tially found injury based on the mere presence of industrial phosphoric 
acid imports in the American market. This conclusion, Chairman Liebeler 
wrote, was contrary to the intent of Congress, since the mere presence of 
imports in the U.S. market inevitably will, all other things being equal, 
lower the price of the domestic product, applying basic economic princi-
ples of supply and demand.404 Such a blatantly protectionist result clearly 
was not Congress' intent when it enacted the Trade Agreements Act of 
1979. In her view, the small market share held by imports, together with 
the low to moderate margins of subsidization and dumping (14.67 percent 
for Belgium and 7 percent for Israel), were factors militating, on balance, 
in favor of a negative determination.4011 
While the cumulation provision might in itself be a source of friction 
between the United States and Canada given its demonstrated potential 
for easing the burden of petitioners in proving injury, this provision 
throws the binational review panel and the Court of International Trade 
together into a jurisdictional morass. When Canadian imports are the 
subject of an antidumping or CVD injury investigation together with im-
ports from other countries, how will it be possible to isolate the Canadian 
portion of any final injury determination where the cumulation provision 
was applied from the balance of the determination? If the entire case is 
brought before the Court of International Trade in a situation where 
binational panel review has been requested for the Canadian portion of 
the determination, the court will lack jurisdiction to review that portion of 
the determination. But how will the court be able to review the balance of 
the ITC determination without also considering the role Canadian im-
ports played in the Commission's injury determination? The answer is 
obvious. The converse is equally true for binational review panel. A panel 
will exceed its jurisdictional mandate if it considers any part of an ITC 
injury determination that turns on a consideratjon of imports from third 
countries, but will at the same time be unable to assess the Commission's 
cumulation analysis unless it does precisely that which it is prohibited to 
402. [d. at 20. 
403. [d. at 22. 
404. [d. at 25-26 (Liebeler. dissenting). 
405. [d. at 31-35 (Liebeler. dissenting). 
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do. One sensible solution would have been to cut this Gordian knot and 
enact a statutory exemption for Canadian imports from the cumulation 
provision of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. Regrettably, in the imple-
menting legislation for the u.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Congress 
did not exempt Canadian imports from the cumulation provision.406 This 
is unfortunate as well as puzzling, considering that Congress did carve out 
a qualified exception from the cumulation provision for Israel in the Om-
nibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.407 In section 1330 of that 
Act, Congress gave the Commission authority to exclude from its cumula-
tion analysis "negligible imports," expressly including within the defini-
tion of "negligible imports," 
imports that are the product of any country that is a party to a 
free trade area agreement with the United States which entered 
into force and effect before January 1, 1987 [i.e., Israel], if the 
Commission determines that the domestic industry is not being 
materially injured by reason of such imports.408 
The refusal on the part of Congress to likewise exempt Canada will 
406. The Senate report to the FT A implementing legislation noted that: 
All other options for the treatment of panel and court decisions involving affirmative ITC 
determinations in which it cumulatively assesses the effect of imports from Canada and 
other countries are adminstratively unworkable and would accord the Agreement a sub-
stantive impact on the antidumping and countervailing duty laws that is not intended. 
S. REP. No. 509, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 34, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 
2395, 2429. 
407. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1330(b), 102 
Stat. 1 \07 (1988) (amending § 771(7)(c) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 1677 
(7)(c». 
408. Section 1330(b), Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 
102 Stat. 1107 (1988) (amending section 771(7)(C) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677(7)(C». The House Conference Report on the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 
1988 states regarding § 1330(b): 
The conferees agreed to an amendment that provides a special rule for investigations in-
volving imports from Israel. ... Before applying this provision, in any investigation involv-
ing imports from Israel, the ITC would first determine whether a domestic industry is 
materially injured by reason of the imports from Israel. If the ITC ~ade an affirmative 
determination, this provision would not apply. If the ITC made a negative determination, 
it would be authorized to consider such imports as negligible and having no discernable 
impact on the domestic industry. 
H.R. CONF. REP. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 621, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS 1547, 1654. 
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only complicate the review process by both the Court of International 
Trade and the binational review panel created under Chapter 19 of the 
Free Trade Agreement, setting the stage for inconsistent judicial and 
panel decisions in companion cases stemming from the same Commission 
affirmative injury determination.409 It is an issue that ultimately will have 
to be addressed by the chapter 19 Working Group whose task it is to 
devise a substitute CVD and antidumping regime for the two countries, a 
matter this article addresses in its concluding remarks. 
RECOMMENDA TIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Having committed themselves to use their best efforts to draft a substi-
tute CVD legal regime over the next seven years, where do Canada and 
the United States go from here? Because of the perception in Canada that 
the use of subsidies is a national prerogative and that any suggestion to 
limit that use is a threat to national sovereignty, the CVD issue figured 
prominently in discussions over free trade between Canada and the 
United States. Unfortunately, because it is so politically sensitive, the issue 
of countervailing duties in u.S.-Canadian trade has been blown out of 
proportion to its actual economic significance. This is truly an economic 
tempest in a teapot in view of the historically small CVD margins that the 
ITA has found for Canadian imports, usually under six percent,410 the 
fifteen percent margin in Softwood Lumber being an exceptional case. An 
equally important but overlooked fact is that the return to even a success-
ful petitioner has been negligible given the small CVD margins typically 
found in these cases, coupled with the cost in attorneys' fees and demands 
409. See S. REP. No. 509, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 34, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 2395, 2429, where it was noted: 
[d. 
[IJn a case where the ITC has made an affirmative injury determination on the basis of 
cumulating imports from Canada with imports from other countries, the CIT is to decide 
the case before it (concerning imports from other countries) on the record as it was before 
the lTC at the time the lTC made its original determination. 
The outcome of a binational panel proceeding in a companion case concerning the im-
ports from Canada that were cumulated shall have no bearing on the lTC's record or on 
the validity of the lTC determination as it affects imports from other countries. Moreover, 
the CIT, in deciding 'the companion case before it, shall disregard any action taken by the 
lTC to implement a final decision of a binational panel .... 
410. See, e.g., Oil Country Tubular Goods From Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,037 (Dep't Comm. 
1986) (final affirm. determination) (.72%); Certain Fresh Atlantic Groundfish From Canada, 51 Fed. 
Reg. 10,041 (Oep't Comm. 1986) (final affirm. determination) (5.82%); Fresh Cut Flowers from 
Canada, 52 Fed. Reg. 2,134 (Oep't Comm. 1987) (final affirm. determination) (1.47%). 
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on executive time.4ll 
As the foregoing has shown, Canada and the United States are not that 
far apart in their approach to subsidies and in their administration of 
their respective CVD statutes. In fact, the administrative procedure 
adopted by each country is remarkably parallel, probably owing in large 
measure to the GATT Subsidies Code which set out the basic procedural 
framework to be followed when a country imposes a countervailing duty. 
One significant area where Canada and the United States do part paths, 
however, is their treatment of regional programs. In the Grain Corn de-
termination, the Department of National Revenue made it clear that with 
certain qualifications regional programs of another country do not consti-
tute countervailable subsidies. The Commerce Department's "Preferen-
tiality Appendix" published in 1986 shows that the U.S. position on this 
score is diametrically opposed to the Canadian view: because regional pro-
grams are not generally available but rather are preferential, and because 
they confer a benefit upon that particular geographic region, they are 
countervailable under the specificity test.412 
Notwithstanding this philosophical difference over regional subsidies, 
the Canadian and U.S. CVD laws, procedurally, are remarkably alike. 
The agencies established to administer the respective countries' CVD stat-
utes conduct their investigations pursuant to rules and timeframes that 
closely track one another. As noted, this parallelism is probably largely 
attributable to the GATT Subsidies Code, which sets forth the procedural 
steps that must be followed before a countervailing duty may be levied on 
imports. Substantively, both CVD laws are also remarkably similar. The 
hallmark of countervailability in both countries is preferentiality, as exem-
411. See Horlick & Landers, The Free Trade Agreement Working Group: Developing a Har-
monized and Improved Countervailing Duty Law, in The U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement: The 
Economic and Legal Implications 404-05 & n. 5 (ABA 1988). On the costs to Canadian industries of 
defending against CVD cases, see Rugman, U.S. Protectionism and Canadian Trade Policy, 20 J. 
WORLD TRADE L. 363, 373 (1986), where the author states: 
Id. 
In the first nine months of the Atlantic fresh groundfish countervail the cOSts approached 
one million dollars raised by the Fisheries Council of Canada from independent fishermen 
as well as the only large integrated Nova Scotia fish producer, National Sea Products Ltd. 
The costs to the Canadian steel industry in 1983-4 ITC cases were well over one million 
dollars. The costs to Canadian hog and pork producers, dried saltcod producers, raspberry 
producers, sugar producers and others are also of considerable magnitude. 
412. For additional reading on the specificity test, see Panzarella, Is the SPecificity Test Gener-
ally Available? 18 L. & POL'y INT'\. Bus. 417 (1986); Note, Countervailing Duties and the Specific-
ity Test: An Alternative Approach to the Definition of "Bounty or Grant", 18 L. & POL'y INT'L 
Bus. 475 (1986). 
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plified in the specificity test employed on both sides of the border. These 
two CVD laws have much in common procedurally and substantively, al-
though they concededly part paths over their treatment of regional 
subsidies. 
The Chapter 19 Working Group will be responsible for negotiating a 
substitute CVD regime that will cover all Canadian-U.S. trade inter sese. 
The range of substitute CVD regimes is obviously broad.413 Some have 
suggested that an agreement could be concluded that would mitigate the 
impact of each countries' CVD law by limiting their reach by, for exam-
ple, raising the de minimis level from .5 percent, or requiring a fixed 
percentage of market penetration by imports and/or price undercutting by 
imports.Hoi Along this same line, a substitute system could require a more 
demanding injury standard, particularly at the preliminary stage where 
the "reasonable indication" evidentiary threshold for petitioners is ex-
tremely low. These changes in the CVD laws, however, will not necessa-
rily eliminate the filing of unfounded petitions and the accompanying har-
assment factor (although careful agency screening prior to initiation of an 
investigation could mitigate that factor). 
Taking the exemption option to its logical extreme, a total exemption 
from each country's CVD law is another option,416 although in the opin-
ion of some commentators a blanket exemption is a political impossibil-
ity.416 A bilateral exemption would require at a minimum a commitment 
413. See, e.g., Horlick & Landers, supra note 411, at 403-04. 
414. For these and other suggestions, see Horlick & Landers, supra note 411, at 412-15; Smith, 
A Canadian Perspective, in Perspectives on A U.S.-Canadian Free Trade Agreement 31, 43 (R. 
Stern, P. Trezise, J. Whalley eds. 1987) [hereinafter Smith]; Wonnacott, supra note 1, at 101-08. 
41,. See Terry, supra note 7, where the author notes: 
One approach is that taken in the agreements between the European Community and the 
European Free Trade Association countries. Under these agreements, each party pledges to 
dismantle voluntarily any subsidy programs that distort trade. If one party does not live up 
to its commitment, the other retains the right to invoke countervail[ing] duties. 
Another model is provided by the European Community itself. It does not permit coun-
tervailing duties on trade among member countries, and uses a complex supranational reg-
ulatory and legal system to control the subsidy practices of its members. 
Id. at 92-93 (footnotes omitted). See also Panzarella, supra note 412, at 428-41. 
416. See Horlick & Landers, supra note 411, at 403. Two examples of where countries entered 
into a free trade arrangement but did not create a CVD exemption are the U.S.-Israeli Free Trade 
Agreement and the Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement signed by New Zealand and Austra-
lia in 1983. See Lussenberg, A Legal Frameworkfor Freer Canada-United States Trade: A Consid-
eration of the Australia-New Zealand Agreement for Closer Economic Relations, in THE LEGAL 
FRAMt:WORK FOR CANADA-UNITED STATES TRADE 91 (M. Irish & E. Carasco, eds. 1987); James, 
The Agreement on Establishment of a Free Trade A rea Between the Government of the United States 
of American and the Government of Israel: Background and Analysis, in THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
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from Canada and the United States to limit their subsidy practices.417 Po-
litical feasibility aside, any substitute system that accords favored bilateral 
treatment (as any of these exemptions would) derogates from GATT's 
unconditional most-favored-nation cornerstone, one of the pillars of trade 
liberalization.418 Granting bilateral exemptions runs the risk of driving a 
wedge between North America and its two other major trading partners, 
Japan and the EC. Any substitute system that in the long run fuels a 
trade war with the other trading partners of Canada and the United 
States is clearly undesirable. In short, while the desiderata should be 
amendments to the CVD statutes that are applicable to all imports re-
gardless of origin, making such amendments generally applicable reduces 
the chances of seeing them enacted by the national legislatures. 
Because of the international trade friction that would likely result from 
a bilateral CVD exemption (assuming such an exemption could be suc-
cessfully passed through Parliament and Congress), an exemption would 
probably not be in the best long-term interests of either Canada or the 
United States. A proposal that might fair better in the political arena 
would be to create a binational administrative agency which would ad-
minister a CVD code applicable on a conditional most-favored-nation ba-
sis.419 On the administrative level the first step would be to merge the two 
countries' processes by creating a binational adlllinistrative agency. Given 
the similarity in administrative procedure followed in both countries, cre-
ating a binational administrative agency or agencies to administer a bilat-
eral CVD code is one option that would not be extremely difficult to im-
plement, considering that this has already been done at the judicial review 
level with the chapter 19 binational review panels completely replacing 
the Canadian and U.S. courts in reviewing administrative determinations 
reached by Revenue Canada, the Import Tribunal, the IT A, and the 
ITC. Establishing binational administrative bodies would be little more 
than a cosmetic measure, however, if the Canadian and U.S. CVD laws 
are not simultaneously harmonized. Although a binational administrative 
agency arguably would be less susceptible to political pressure (assuming 
such pressure exists and is effective in influencing administrative decisions 
FOR CANADA-U.S. TRADE, supra, at 143. 
417. See Smith, supra note 414, at 44. 
418. See McRae & Thomas, The Development of the Most-Favored-Nation Principle: Treaties 
of Friendship, Navigation and Commerce and the GATT, in THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR CA-
NADA-U.S. TRADE, supra note 416, at 225. 
419. A variation on this theme has been a proposal to limit a binational administrative agency's 
responsibility to a determination of whether an unlawful subsidy exists, leaving it with national tribu-
nals to determine whether such subsidized imports are the cause of material injury. See Terry, supra 
note 7, at 94. 
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in the first place),420 supranational administration of the current CVD 
laws of the two countries it would be tantamount to pouring old wine into 
a new bottle absent amendment of the substantive provisions of the repsec-
tive CVD statutes. (The chapter 19 binational review panels are very 
much analogous to old wine in a new bottle-the panels are required to 
apply the law of the country imposing the countervailing duty in the same 
manner as a reviewing court in that country would).421 Harmonizing the 
two countries' CVD statutes has the advantage of eliminating the CVD 
laws as a trade flashpoint. Moreover, by expanding on a CVD code to 
make it applicable not just bilaterally but rather multilaterally on a condi-
tional most-favored-nation basis, there is a reasonable prospect that a 
multilateral trade war could be avoided. Ideally, a code should be applica-
ble on an unconditional most-favored-nation basis, in order to avoid the 
discrimination that creeps into a trade system based on reciprocity and 
preferences and to eliminate the barriers to the free flow of goods across 
national borders. However, the odds of getting a CVD code enacted on an 
unconditional most-favored-nation basis are probably low. Making a bi-
lateral CVD code applicable on a conditional basis enhances the chances 
for such a code being enacted by Congress. Nevertheless, even if only a 
bilateral CVD code is agreed to between Canada and the United States 
that exempts regional subsidies with qualifications (as will be discussed 
below), and that code is applicable on a conditional most-favored-nation 
basis, the EC should automatically qualify for code coverage, given its 
practice of exempting regional subsidies that are not trade distorting.422 In 
any event, the EC's role in both Canadian and U.S. trade is prominent; it 
is a trading partner deserving of sympathetic consideration in Working 
Group negotiations. Coverage under a CVD code should be extended to 
it. 
Although there is undeniably a good deal of refining that would be 
required before a binational administrative agency charged with adminis-
tering a binational CVD code could be implemented, the single greatest 
obstacle to harmonization of the Canadian and U.S. CVD laws is the 
issue of regional subsidies. For Canadians, this is an especially sensitive 
matter, as reflected in vehement denials by the Canadian government that 
420. With judicial review existing for all final administrative determinations of the ITA and the 
lTC, rational decisionmaking consistent with statute has to be the hallmark of any determination 
reached by these agencies or such determinations will not be sustained upon judicial review. Thus, 
judicial review serves as a sword and shield for the agencies involved, arming them with defenses with 
which they can deflect extralegal arguments. 
421. FTA, supra note 8, art. 1904:3. 
422. See infra note 426 and accompanying text. 
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FT A negotiators had offered to restrict regional subsidies as part of a free 
trade package.423 The objection to subsidies is that they distort the alloca-
tion of resources within a market by sending a signal to capitalists and 
entrepreneurs where they should invest capital, thus diverting domestic 
resources from possibly more productive uses and at the same time deny-
ing a sale to competing foreign industries,,24 But not all government inter-
ventions are efficiency distorting; indeed, they may correct a market dis-
tortion or market externality,,26 As summarized by one commentator: 
Subsidies granted ... to new investment in depressed geographical 
regions have a more particularized effect on the output of given 
products. They are likely to have more pronounced effects on 
trade flows, as well. Should such subsidies be prohibited and 
countries be free to countervail or take other retaliatory action 
against them? Arguments for such a general rule face two serious 
difficulties. First, in a given case such government interventions in 
the domestic market, in contrast generally to export subsidies, may 
be either efficiency enhancing or distorting. A general prohibition 
cannot be based on the certainty that such subsidies are always 
inefficient. Second, even if a given subsidy is clearly inefficient ... 
governments may pursue such a policy for internal political or 
socioeconomic objectives.426 
If it can be demonstrated that regional subsidies are not trade dis-
torting, they should not be countervailed. In the 1982 steel cases involving 
EC steel imports to the United States, the EC argued that no benefit was 
conferred by government incentives to invest in disadvantaged geographic 
regions where those incentives were specifically designed to offset the dis-
location costs of establishing a business in that region. Since they do not 
confer a benefit, the argument ran, they cannot by definition be trade 
distorting. The ITA rejected this argument, stating that subsidies which 
affect the comparative advantage of a region are by definition trade dis-
torting,,27 This may be true on a strictly national level, but it does not 
necessarily follow that the same is true on the world level. The United 
423. No Proposal on Regional Subsidies Offered by Canada in FTA Negotiations, Reisman 
Says, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1512 (1988). 
424. See Schwartz & Harper, The Regulation of Subsidies Affecting International Trade, 70 
MICH. L. REV. 831,840 (1972). 
425. See Barcelo, Subsidies and Countervailing Duties-Analysis and A Proposal, 9 L. & 
POI.'Y INT'!. Bus. 779, 788-94 (1977). 
426. Id. at 837 (rootnotes omitted). 
427. Certain Steel Products rrom Belgium, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,304 (Dep't Comm. 1982). 
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States should reconsider its position on this question and allow for the 
possibility that certain regional subsidies do nothing more than equalize 
competitive conditions within a geographic area vis-a-vis the rest of the 
nation (e.g., lack of infrastructure or skilled workforce). As long as there 
is no trade distortion on the international level, regional subsidies should 
not be countervailed. As noted by Professor Barcelo: 
[I]t can be argued that a subsidizing country at least should have 
the right to submit evidence that the subsidy in question does not 
distort world trade. For example, a country might be able to show 
that a subsidy on new investment in a depressed and backward 
geographical region was just adequate to offset the added costs of 
locating in the region and that the subsidy was not distortive. A 
successful submission should mean that the subsidy in question 
would be permitted and offsetting countervailing duties would not 
be allowed.428 
A variation on this theme that has been proposed elsewhere429 is to 
permit the imposition of countervailing duties on the net subsidy in re-
gional development cases. The net subsidy would be derived by deducting 
from the government assistance the increased costs of locating in a de-
pressed region as measured against locating in the prime industrial area 
within the country. Regional subsidies would thus only be countervailable 
to the extent they gave an industry a net competitive advantage with re-
spect to other firms within the national market. This in fact was the U.S. 
practice prior to 1979, a practice rejected by Congress when it enacted the 
Trade Agreements Act of 1979.430 By coupling this net subsidy concept 
with a higher de minimis threshold (to say, four or five percent), many 
regional development programs would escape the CVD net. 
In conclusion, nominal regional subsidies that are in fact disguised ex-
port subsidies should not be permitted where, for example, the level of 
assistance is so high, and the resulting stimulative effect on production so 
great, that the domestic economy is totally incapable of absorbing the ma-
jor portion of output of industries located in the region. Second, the re-
gions eligible for government assistance should be agreed to and identified 
in advance. Third, the kinds and level of government assistance should be 
428. Barcelo, supra note 425, at 838-39 (footnotes omitted). 
429. See WONNACOTT, supra note I, at 107. 
430. S. REP. No. 249, supra note 143, at 86, 1979 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 381 
("offsets under present law which are permitted ... for increased costs as a result of locating in an 
underdeveloped area, are not now permitted as offsets"). 
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agreed to in advance if possible, in order to avoid the disguised export 
subsidy problem. Alternatively, the amount of import penetration of goods 
manufactured in the region receiving the subsidy could be agreed to in 
advance, thereby serving in effect as a predetermination of injury to the 
competing domestic industry. The regional subsidies issue presents diffi-
cult negotiating problems, but none of them are intractable. 
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